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Abstract 
NATO’s decision to set up the eFP battlegroups in 2016 was a major achievement, 
however, it is only a tripwire force, and the Alliance relies heavily on rapid reinforcement 
in times of crisis. Airpower is a potent tool to support rapid reinforcement, but the 
geography of the Baltic Sea region severely limits NATO’s operational depth which is 
necessary for air operations. NATO’s ability for (rapid) reinforcement of its Eastern flank 
by air, sea, and land, is further challenged by Russia’s anti-access and area denial 
(A2/AD) capability. By implementing its A2/AD capability, Russia actively challenges 
and mitigates NATO’s deterrence posture.  
Currently, the Baltic States possess short-range missile air defense capability with a very 
limited range. While a very important part of NATO’s peacetime activities, the Baltic Air 
Policing Mission has limited rules of engagement (RoE) and does not prepare NATO for 
providing air defense for some of its most vulnerable Allies on the Eastern flank of the 
Alliance. 
This thesis relies on existing literature and twenty expert interviews to provide a 
comprehensive and up-to-date account of the complex issue of using airpower to 
strengthen the deterrence and defense posture of NATO in the Baltic States. The main 
findings of the research are that (1) the concept of A2/AD and its impact for deterrence 
is not well understood and this makes it difficult to address it; (2) There is no common 
understanding among the experts what a transition from Baltic Air Policing to air defense 
would mean; and (3) the importance of the Baltic States collectively taking the initiative 
in the air defense realm is currently understated.  
Gaining a better understanding of the contested environment presented by Russia, forging 
a common perception of the range of (airpower) measures that NATO has available, and 
exercising rapid reinforcement exercises in a joint environment could help the Alliance 
strengthen its deterrence and defense posture in the Baltic States. It is important that this 
would be done while preserving NATO’s most valuable asset – the unity of the Alliance.   
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Introduction 
The decisions taken at the NATO Warsaw Summit in 2016, particularly the one of 
establishing Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP), are a significant contribution to the 
ground forces of the Baltic States, and send an important message about the commitment 
of the Allies to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. However, there are several 
questions to be asked about the strength of NATO’s deterrent on the Eastern flank of the 
Alliance. 
Multinational battalion-size battlegroups in each of the Baltic States considerably 
strengthen the deterrence posture and the first line of defense, but NATO’s deterrent in 
the Baltic States is heavily reliant on rapid reinforcement in the event of a military crisis. 
This is highly problematic as there are logistical, bureaucratic, and political factors that 
make transporting heavy military equipment and troops difficult and time-consuming.  
In addition to that, reinforcing troops, and the land, air and sea routes, as well as ports 
through which they arrive, are valuable targets from the air, and it is therefore a major 
problem that there is limited air defense to protect these critical assets. Currently, the 
Baltic States possess only short-range ground-based air defense systems, though 
procurement of a medium-range system is currently ongoing in Lithuania, and Latvia 
have announced plans to do the same. The Baltic Air Policing Mission is strictly a 
peacetime mission, and there is no clear plan as to whether or how its resources could be 
used in the event of a military crisis.  
Russia’s has set up anti-access, area-denial (A2/AD) zones and the objective of this is to 
prevent the attacker from bringing its forces into the contested region (A2). If the forces 
of the opponent do get to the region, to prevent them from freely operating within the area 
(AD). Russia’s A2/AD capabilities present a multi-dimensional challenge, and NATO 
airpower is the key to addressing this.  
The purpose of this research is to examine possibilities for and challenges to the 
application of NATO airpower in the Baltic Sea region. More specifically, the research 
seeks to find out how can NATO use its airpower to strengthen its deterrence and defense 
posture on its Eastern flank and support NATO’s reinforcement efforts.  
Tackling this issue presupposes a broader discussion on airpower attributes, 
considerations regarding air superiority and the theory of deterrence theory, as well as an 
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overview of the security environment of the Baltic Sea region. The core of this thesis is 
the data collected through twenty expert interviews with respondents from the Baltic 
States, the U.S, the U.K., Sweden and Finland. Their perspectives are analyzed and 
compared with the existing literature on the topic which comes mostly in the form of 
think tank reports and journal and newspaper articles. A synthesis of major works on 
airpower and deterrence, as well as relevant airpower doctrines provides the theoretical 
framework for this study.   
The added value of this research lies in its original approach in tackling this timely issue 
and providing a comprehensive and up-to-date account on the topic. This thesis does so  
by analyzing data that was gathered through personal interviews in order to better engage 
with various gray areas that appear in the literature on this under-researched topic.  
Despite the unavoidable use of specialized vocabulary and terminology, this thesis 
explores and explains the topic in a way that is understandable not only for airman and 
airpower experts, but to everyone interested in defense issues. This helps alleviate the 
problem where it is mostly airman writing about the topic in a way that might not be 
accessible for defense planners, politicians, and the general public who have limited 
knowledge of airpower attributes and its importance in the deterrence posture of NATO.   
The thesis starts with a synthesis of theoretical literature on the issues of airpower and 
deterrence (Chapter 1), and goes on to Chapter 2 to explain the context in which airpower 
will be used, describing the security situation in the Baltic Sea region. Chapter 3 describes 
the methodological approach chosen for this thesis, and explains the sampling for and 
structure of the semi-structured expert interviews. As the groundwork is laid in the first 
three chapters, Chapter 4 draws mostly on the original data to contrast and compare the 
viewpoints of the interviewees regarding deterrence and application of Allied airpower in 
the Baltic Sea region. 
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1. Theoretical Framework: Understanding Airpower, Deterrence, and A2/AD  
 
This chapter explains the theoretical underpinnings of the issue of strengthening the 
deterrence and defense posture in the Baltic States through Allied airpower. Given the 
complexity of the topic, there is no single theoretical framework that could be readily 
used. Instead, this chapter provides a synthesis of issues, starting with airpower in theory 
and doctrines, continuing on to the deterrence theory, and finally, considering deterrence 
in a modern context, with particular attention to A2/AD capabilities.  
Despite the relatively short time period that aviation has been around, there is a wealth of 
material on airpower theory, dating all the way back to the first decades of the twentieth 
century. Airpower advocates and theorists such as Giulio Douhet, William Mitchell, 
Hugh Trenchard, and Arthur ‘Bomber’ Harris worked with the subject in its formative 
years, often describing capabilities that did not exist at the time, but that they argued were 
going to be revolutionary in warfighting (Mueller 2010, 1). As Gray argues, “Airpower 
arrived on a strategic scene that was already fully occupied institutionally by armies and 
navies,” thus a lot of effort was put into thinking about capabilities and attributes that 
distinguished the air domain from that of the land and maritime domains (Gray 2012, 59). 
Coercion and targeting were a central part of the debate, and the question arose of how to 
best utilize airpower to gain the strongest possible influence over the enemy and make 
them reconsider their goals and actions. Echoing the ideas of Douhet, Mitchell wrote in 
1925: “The missions of armies and navies are very greatly changed from what they were. 
No longer will the tedious and expensive processes of wearing down the enemy's land 
forces by continuous attacks be resorted to. The air forces will strike immediately at the 
enemy's manufacturing and food centers, railways, bridges, canals and harbors,” arguing 
that this would bring a relatively quick end to warfighting (quoted in Fehrmann 1997, 3). 
Douhet and Harris, for example, argued that the heart of an enemy's resistance was its 
population, and claimed that airpower the best tool to destroy the psychological will of 
enemy’s society and hereby achieve victory (Faber 1996). 
A contemporary airpower theorist, John Warden III, uses a model of five concentric rings 
to explain his idea of the coercive might of airpower that can be achieved through 
targeting. According to Warden, the leadership is in the middle as the most important 
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target, followed by system essentials/key production, infrastructure, population, and 
finally, fielded military forces (Olsen 2007, 109). Presenting a very different perspective, 
another contemporary thinker, Robert Pape argued in his 1996 book Bombing to Win: Air 
Power and Coercion in War that airpower, in fact, is best used exactly against fielded 
forces through missions such as interdiction and close air support. 
While useful in understanding the theoretical debate regarding airpower, the strategies of 
targeting and strategic bombing are not of the most relevance for this study. Instead, the 
focus will be on airpower attributes and tasks, discussions on control of the air, integration 
of airpower with other domains, and the theory of deterrence in a contested environment. 
Airpower is an extensive subject and it is clear that no one theory can adequately explain 
the issue. This chapter will provide a synthesis of relevant ideas, many of which originate 
from airpower theorists and have found their place in modern-day doctrines., The final 
part of this chapter explores the concept of deterrence and its relation to airpower and 
thereby concludes the theoretical discussion. 
 
1.1 Airpower in Theory and Doctrines: Understanding Airpower’s Might   
Official Air Force doctrinal publications often itemize the fundamental 
“core characteristics” of airpower. This is of little value to air 
professionals who know it intuitively by education, by osmosis, and by 
experience, but it is vitally important that the non-air professionals, who 
constitute a substantial majority in the defense community as well as in 
society at large, be educated as to the nature of airpower. 
--Colin Gray in Air Power for Strategic Effect (2012, 162). 
 
Based on an official NATO definition, doctrine is understood as “Fundamental principles 
by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative 
but requires judgement in application” (NATO 2016, LEX-6). Long before having 
doctrines, armed forces had theories and regulations that outlined fundamental principles 
relevant to the issue. The problem with this was that they did not take into account the 
specific conditions for any countries, and they also “did not prescribe anything, and were 
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not binding on anyone” (van Creveld 2011, 237). As Figure 1 demonstrates, the link 
between theory of strategy, theory of airpower, and airpower doctrines remains strong.  
Figure 1: Airpower from theory to practice as outlined by Colin Gray  
 
Source:  Colin Gray (2012, 32)  
 
A confirmation of the strong link of between airpower theory and doctrines is the fact that 
many ideas that appear in the writings of early airpower theorists have found their rightful 
place in the modern-day airpower doctrines of NATO and its allies, particularly those of 
the Royal Air Force of the United Kingdom (RAF), and the United States Air Force 
(USAF).   
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1.2 The Air Environment and Airpower Tasks   
The air environment is unique: already the early theorists argued that the true nature of 
airpower lies in its ability operate in its own domain. As air fully surrounds the Earth, 
operating in this environment is a very important geophysical characteristic that gives 
airpower significant flexibility (Gray 2012, 24). NATO doctrine acknowledges that air 
capabilities are just one of the many military and non-military tools that the Alliance 
possesses, but airpower is exceptional for its “flexible and responsive ways to create and 
exert influence; ranging from direct physical attacks to more nuanced, psychological 
effects” (NATO 2016, 1-2).  
The doctrine further reads, “Airpower is pervasive, as aircraft are rarely physically 
constrained by national boundaries or terrain, so can potentially obtain access to any point 
on Earth. The distinctiveness of the environment means that airpower has very different 
attributes to maritime power and land power” (NATO 2016, 1-2). This gives airpower a 
unique ability to take actions throughout a very wide area, which might sometimes be 
deep in hostile territory. Besides being “truly global in nature,” airpower can undertake 
missions that are fast-paced and continually evolving (United Kingdom Ministry of 
Defense 2017, 21; Berkland 2011, 393). For these very reasons, it is difficult to pinpoint 
airpower on a map: a unit that is based somewhere is able to exert influence far beyond 
the boundaries of the air base (Mueller 2010, 7). As Olsen argues, it is crucial to make a 
distinction between the enduring aspects of airpower on the one side, and the “ever-
shifting technical and tactical elements that express the application of airpower in various 
contexts of time and place” on the other (2015, 9). The three core airpower attributes that 
are universal and do not depend on a certain platform or technological solution, are speed, 
reach and height (NATO 2016, 1-3).  
However, airpower also has some limitations, despite airpower theorists as well as airmen 
sometimes having a tendency to “overstate the extent of freedom of action” that aircraft 
enjoy (Moeller 2010, 5). For instance, aircraft are vulnerable as operating them 
successfully depends on weather and basing (unless there is an opportunity for air-to-air 
refueling). Air assets are also fragile, with limited persistence and payload, and rely on 
heavy infrastructure requirements (NATO 2016). In addition to that, there are legal 
factors that restrain the effects of airpower, as the airspace above the territory of any 
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country is sovereign, and aircraft need to follow certain rules and procedures in order to 
be able to use it (United Kingdom Ministry of Defense 2017, 12). In the NATO Alliance, 
the use of airpower is further regulated by the Rules of Engagement (RoE), created by the 
North Atlantic Council (NAC). In some instances, this can mean serious restrictions to 
actions that pilots in certain areas or while conducting certain missions are allowed to 
undertake (NATO 2016, 1-16). 
 
Airpower contributes to a wide variety of tasks, ranging from high-end war fighting, to 
providing situational awareness in peacetime, engaging in counter-terrorism operations 
and providing humanitarian assistance (United Kingdom Ministry of Defense 2017, 6). 
Airpower is often falsely associated only with combat roles. As Turrisi put it, “Airpower 
does not solely mean dropping bombs and engaging hostile fighter aircraft. It is 
universally, ubiquitously and strategically useful. There is an air narrative integral to 
every conflict,” (2013). A common criticism to early airpower theorists is that they 
devoted disproportionate amount of attention to strategic bombardment, which is actually 
only one of many different tasks that airpower can undertake (Faber 1996).  
NATO Air and Space Doctrine (2016) distinguishes between five airpower roles:  
● Counter-air  
● Attack 
● Air mobility 
● Contribution to Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)  
● Support to joint personnel recovery  
 
Counter-air operations are undertaken to gain and maintain control of the air – a 
precondition for fulfilling various other airpower tasks. Counter-air operations can be 
both offensive and defensive, and take into account the fact that the fight for the control 
of the air is continuous (NATO 2016, 1-8). Attack is offensive in nature and can be used 
to coerce adversaries to change their behavior. Air mobility can be understood as “the 
ability to deploy, sustain and recover personnel and equipment, often over significant 
distance” (United Kingdom Ministry of Defense 2017, 37). The three main missions of 
air mobility are airlift, air-to-air refueling, and personnel recovery.  
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Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) is a crucial task both in peacetime 
and in the event of a crisis, as it provides information and develops situational awareness, 
therefore contributing heavily to planning different operations and missions. Through its 
ability to provide information about the vulnerabilities, strengths, and patterns of the 
adversary, it is an integral part of decision-making (United Kingdom Ministry of Defense 
2017, 29).  
Based on the attributes of airpower, Colin Gray has made the following observations 
regarding the tasks that airpower can undertake:   
 
Figure 2: Characteristic strengths and weaknesses of airpower by Colin Gray 
 
Source: Colin Gray (2012, 281). 
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Control of the Air  
“He who controls the air controls everything”  
-- Giulio Douhet in Command of the Air, 1921 
 
In order to be able to use the useful attributes of airpower and deny the enemy to do the 
same, there is a broad consensus that an air force needs to achieve control of the air. 
Control of the air is the fundamental enabler for all of airpower’s contributions to strategic 
effect (Gray 2015, 164). Douhet in his classic 1921 Command of the Air considered this 
topic in depth. He argued: “A nation which has command of the air is in a position to 
protect its own territory from enemy aerial attack and even to put a halt to the enemy’s 
auxiliary actions in support of his land and sea operations, leaving him powerless to do 
much of anything” (Douhet 2003 (1921), 26).  
Though the terms used had changed, later, John Warden argued:  
“Air superiority is a necessity. Since the German attack on Poland in 1939, 
no country has won a war in the face of enemy air superiority, no major 
offensive has succeeded against an opponent who controlled the air, and 
no defense has sustained itself against an enemy who had air superiority. 
Conversely, no state has lost a war while it maintained air superiority, and 
attainment of air superiority consistently has been a prelude to military 
victory. It is vital that commanders, air, and surface be aware of these 
historical facts, and plan accordingly” (1988).  
NATO dictionaries distinguish between two degrees of control of the air: air superiority 
and air supremacy. Air superiority is defined as: “That degree of dominance in the air 
battle of one force over another which permits the conduct of operations by the former 
and its related land, sea and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive 
interference by the opposing force”. Air supremacy is “That degree of air superiority 
wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference” (NATO 2016, LEX-
5). British (United Kingdom Ministry of Defense) Air and Space Power Doctrine defines 
control of the air in terms of freedom and denial as, “The freedom, bound by time, to use 
a volume of airspace for one’s own purposes while, if necessary, denying its use to an 
opponent” (United Kingdom Ministry of Defense 2017, 28). A related term is Favorable 
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Air Situation (FAS), sometimes referred to as local air superiority. The premise of FAS 
is that in some cases, it is not needed or practical to pursue theater-wide air superiority as 
establishing local air superiority – that might also be limited in time – is sufficient for 
certain operations and tasks. 
For the airpower theorists, “Aviation could perform many functions within this [the air] 
domain, but the domain itself had to be secured with air superiority” (Berkland 2011, 
391). This is true in the modern environment as well, as it is extremely difficult to operate 
with airborne early warning and control (AWACS) aircraft and undertake airpower 
operations such as air mobility and combat search and rescue without a certain level of 
protection against threats from the enemy aircraft. Air superiority, has proved as a potent 
assurance against losing a war.  
Douhet went further in claiming what air superiority could accomplish. In 1921, he wrote: 
“To achieve command of the air means victory; to be beaten in the air means defeat and 
acceptance of whatever terms the enemy may be please to impose,” (Douhet 2003, 29). 
While it is true that the historic evidence supports the idea that succeeding in land 
operations while being beaten in the air is very difficult, Douhet’s view that “to achieve 
command of the air means victory” is no longer widely accepted. In fact, there are several 
examples that prove otherwise. Air superiority by no means assures success in a military 
operation, rather, it provides considerable protection from failure.  An example of this is 
Operation Allied Force in 1999 that attempted to press Slobodan Milosevic to stop the 
atrocities against ethnic Albanians in the Serbian province of Kosovo. While the 
international coalition succeeded in achieving air superiority in the whole region, for 
some time, this did nothing to stop the massacre and violence on the ground (Lambeth 
2001).  
Airpower and its integration with other domains   
Airpower theorists have considered the idea of integration of domains. As Gray argues, 
“Airpower both supports and is supported by land power and sea power (and space power 
and cyber power), saying that there can be a “cycle of mutually reinforcing success 
between land and air” (2015, 169). NATO’s comprehensive approach presupposes “the 
early integration of the military instrument into a collective strategy encompassing all of 
the instruments of power” (NATO 2016, 1-1). This is idea is also reflected in NATO Air 
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and Space Doctrine which reads, “However, the synergy of Alliance air forces’ 
capabilities and surface forces, operating as an integrated joint force, can often be 
overwhelming in cases where a single component cannot be decisive by itself” (NATO 
2016, 1-3).  
In the modern context for military operations, it is increasingly unlikely that that the 
mission will be built on the capabilities of a single component. Moreover, the idea of joint 
action and using complementary capabilities between the maritime, land, air, space and 
cyber domains is further developed. The full spectrum approach means enhanced 
synchronization between military forces and government institutions, and can involve 
making use of diplomatic, military and economic instruments of national power, taking 
into consideration the importance of information and communication regarding all of 
them (United Kingdom Ministry of Defense 2017, 49). 
 
1.3 Theory of Deterrence 
Finally, for the purposes of this thesis, it is crucial to outline the key ideas of 
(conventional) deterrence and deterrence theory. NATO’s Allied Joint Doctrine states:  
“NATO must have the full range of capabilities necessary to deter 
and defend against any threat to the safety of Alliance members. 
To that end, NATO will maintain an appropriate mix of forces. 
NATO’s goal is to enhance deterrence as a core element of its 
collective defense and contribute to the indivisible security of the 
Alliance,” (NATO 2017, 2-11).  
Deterrence is defined as: “The prevention of action by the existence of a credible threat 
of unacceptable counteraction and/or belief that the cost of action outweighs the perceived 
benefits” (United States Department of Defense 2018, 69). Patrick Morgan in his 
Deterrence Now explains the term as follows: “The conception of deterrence concerns an 
effort to prevent an attack by threatening unacceptable damage so that in the attacker’s 
cost-benefit calculations the best choice is not to attack” (2003, 44). However, among 
other things, this presumes that the both sides are rational and survival is important.  
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John Mearsheimer, one of the main authors on conventional deterrence, has written about 
the credibility of promised response as a key factor in deterrence, terming this as the 
credibility-of-commitment issue (1985, 18). Deterrence is a complex equation, as Veebel 
argues, “The credibility of deterrence is clearly dependent on specific circumstances, yet, 
because of its controversial nature it is difficult to assess under which circumstances and 
at which point of time deterrence becomes credible. In principle, we are studying 
something which is expected to never occur” (2018, 5).  
Notably, in 1960, Glenn Snyder made a distinction between deterrence by punishment 
and deterrence by denial, which is a useful way of distinguishing between different 
postures. Denial and punishment are different methodologies, but they support one 
another. As Kainikara explains, “Deterrence by punishment relies on assured reprisal 
upon an adversary who attempts to damage national interests by any means. The trigger 
to initiate such punishment need not always be an attack on the nation, but could also be 
adversary actions that directly or indirectly impinge on the nation’s broader security 
interests” (2008, 4).  
Deterrence by denial is a step forward from this in a sense that its objective is to make it 
physically difficult for an adversary to achieve his objective and therefore convince the 
enemy that any attempt to move on with its objectives will fail. Deterrence by denial also 
depends on fear, but in this case it is fear “of costs that will be inflicted during the act of 
aggression, in the place that it occur” (Mitchell 2015).  
Against an opportunistic and imprudent leader who thinks it is possible to deny or resist 
any punishment that the opponent might enforce, deterrence by denial would be a more 
effective posture. Another advantage of deterrence by denial is that should deterrence fail, 
having established a deterrence by denial posture leaves the forces in a much stronger 
position to fight – and prevail – in a military conflict (Gerson 2009, 38). At the same time, 
establishing this posture requires significant resources that need to be in the right place, 
at the right time to visibly prove that any attack would be immediately neutralized and 
retaliated. While the explicit demonstration of some capabilities is a part of creating a 
deterrence posture, not all plans and competences are communicated publicly. This leads 
to the strategic dilemma of escalation vs. de-escalation (Veebel 2018, 3).   
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In conventional deterrence, the idea of fear of protracted, and therefore expensive and 
distressing, conflict holds an important position. According to Mearsheimer, “The threat 
of a war of attrition is the bedrock of conventional deterrence,” (1985, 64). Given the host 
of complications that protracted wars bring, it is clear that “most nations desire and 
develop military strategies designed for rapid, blitzkrieg-style wars,” (Gerson 2009, 37). 
In the deterrence by punishment posture, hopes may be placed on achieving a quick 
victory, a fait accompli, before the opponent can even mobilize its conventional forces.  
Airpower is well equipped to make a significant contribution to deterrence, both by 
punishment and denial. The roles and tasks that air forces can understake, rephrased by 
Kainikara as “detect, decide, deter and defeat” can have potent deterrent effect as they 
contribute to understanding and monitoring the situation on both sides, planning the 
course of action based on the collected data, and potentially attack the centers of gravity 
of the adversary (2008, 8).  
 
1.4 Deterrence in a Modern Context: Understanding A2/AD  
“[…] beyond the purely military perspective, A2/AD embraces other 
dimensions that NATO allies need to acknowledge if the strongest military 
alliance ever is to be serious in undertaking a profound adaptation to the 
new strategic reality”  -- Guillaume Lasconjarias and Tomáš A. Nagy in 
“NATO Adaptation and A2/AD: Beyond the Military Implications” 2017.  
 
While the term anti-access area-denial (A2/AD) has not (yet) found its way into NATO 
doctrines, the concept, and its underlying consequences, have been regularly mentioned 
by top NATO officials. Sam Tangredi, a prominent scholar on A2/AD, argues that from 
a military perspective, the term can be understood as “strategies intended to prevent an 
attacker from being able to bring forces to bear in a strike at a defender’s center of 
gravity,” (2013, 2). A2/AD can also be defined by separating the two functions: ‘The 
objective of an anti-access or area-denial strategy is to prevent the attacker from bringing 
its forces into the contested region (A2) or to prevent the attacker from freely operating 
within the region and maximizing its combat power,” (Lasconjarias and Marrone 2016, 
3).  
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While A2/AD has a very strong connection with the air domain, there is an overwhelming 
consensus that these threats are far from concerning merely the air component. It is a 
multi-domain concept (Yalinalp 2016; Grynkewich 2017a; Schmidt 2016). A2/AD is 
often ensured by an advanced integrated air defense system (IADS) that includes radars, 
aircraft, and surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems. In addition to that, counter-maritime 
forces, short- or medium-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, electronic jammers, and 
other precision guided munitions may be used (Schmidt 2016, 71; Williams 2017; 
Grynkewich 2017a).  
The term A2/AD has come under criticism that goes beyond its apparent shortcoming of 
being very technical. In 2016, U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John 
Richardson announced that U.S. Navy was going to avoid using the term. He argued it: 
“[…] can mean many things to different people or almost anything to anyone,” suggesting 
some people referred to it as a strategy, a family of technologies, or “an impenetrable 
‘keep-out zone’ that forces can enter only at extreme peril to themselves,” (2016).  
There is a consensus among experts that there is nothing entirely new about the strategy 
to keep adversaries away from the contested theaters and limit their ability to maneuver 
inside of them, while, as Richardson put it, “identifying their foes at longer ranges and 
attacking them with ever more destructive weapons” (2016). However, what makes 
A2/AD an increasingly important concept to reckon with, is that “technology has, over 
the years, developed in such a way, that even states with modest defense budgets can 
obtain weapons that are precise enough to be used from large distances, deterring the 
access of any enemy and making A2/AD strategies a real challenge” (Martinez Ordóñez 
2017, 39).  
This has set new parameters for military competition in regional theaters as well as 
globally. As Simon put it, “[…] as a general concept, A2/AD can help to both capture and 
convey the idea that we are entering a new military-technological paradigm — one that 
will affect the nature of the military-strategic competition in virtually every theater, 
although admittedly in different ways,” (2017). In terms of deterrence theory, an integral 
part of this thesis, A2/AD represents deterrence by denial posture, rather than that of 
punishment (Schmidt 2016, 73).  
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The overall impact of A2/AD systems in influencing the strength of deterrence posture 
and deciding the course of conflicts is what makes it a concept to be reckoned with at the 
theoretical and strategic level. Binnendijk has argued that “the increasingly difficult task 
of rapidly gaining air superiority in an A2/AD environment” is the second most important 
task that the forthcoming NATO’s Joint Air Power Strategy should focus on (2016, 36). 
The only task that Binnendijk considered more important is significantly improving “the 
readiness, deployability and sustainability of existing air forces,” (2016, 36).  
In his recent article, U.S. Navy Captain William Perkins used the term Advanced Layered 
Defense Systems instead of A2/AD, arguing that it helps “further articulate the joint 
nature of the problem facing the Nations,” (Perkins 2018, 54). While similar clarifications 
and efforts to make the term more user-friendly are praiseworthy, for the purposes of 
comprehensibility, this thesis will use the more widely known term A2/AD.     
 
Conclusion  
There are several ideas developed by early airpower theorists that are included in modern 
day airpower doctrines – serving as a proof that there are some fundamental 
characteristics of airpower that remain the same despite substantial changes in 
technology. However, airpower theory also involves assumptions that are known not to 
hold true. For instance, strategic bombing campaigns were not able to deliver on the 
promises of bringing rapid and decisive victories, and air campaigns did not make 
populations overthrow their governments as Douhet and other theorists had expected 
(Mueller 2010, 3). 
This is a good indication of the progression of the theory and basic understandings, and 
points to the need of taking into account contemporary strategic developments and 
updating airpower doctrines accordingly. A2/AD capabilities provide the means to 
actively challenge and mitigate the strength of the deterrence posture of an enemy, and 
this makes it a crucial part of explaining the complex interconnection between the 
airpower and deterrence. 
While airpower is an extremely capable tool that can provide often vitally important 
control of the air and undertake a wide range of other important tasks, it is important to 
keep in mind that real value of airpower – in fact, any military power – highly depends 
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on the context and way in which it is applied. Different theaters present very distinctive 
challenges, and airpower will be able to deliver on the strategic goals it was employed to 
achieve only when plans of action are crafted with the specific circumstances in mind.   
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2. Airpower in Context: Security Situation in the Baltic Sea Region 
The application of airpower in the Baltic Sea region needs to take into consideration both 
the doctrines of airpower described in the previous chapter, as well as the broader security 
context in the region. This chapter starts with a general overview of  the security situation, 
and moves on to consider the military and airpower capabilities of Russia and the Baltic 
States and NATO. The latter part of the chapter explains Russia’s A2/AD capabilities and 
its role in country’s strategy.  
In 2016, the Joint Air Power Competence Center (JAPCC), one of the NATO Centers of 
Excellence, characterized the security situation by the following trends:   
● Allied relations with Russia are in a downward spiral. 
● Challenges from the South are becoming more dangerous and are difficult to 
deter. 
● NATO deterrence will further erode without strong US support and increased 
Allied defense spending. 
● Europe appears ever more divided and incapable of deterring Russia in the East 
without strong US Support. 
● Potential adversaries will pursue asymmetric means to negate the strength of 
NATO. 
● Expanding Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) environments in and around 
Europe can be expected (2017, 237).  
 
The relationship between Russia and NATO is at a low point not seen in decades. While 
there are no reasons to expect that any kind of military conflict between Russia and NATO 
is imminent, the security situation remains precarious. Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 
2008 did not provoke a strong reaction from NATO, and stimulated Russia to improve on 
its military capabilities, which had proved faulty and substandard in the conflict. In 2014, 
Russia invaded Ukraine by using hybrid tactics embedded in the doctrine of low-intensity 
conflict that, among other things, involves manipulating the enemy’s society.  
Despite the use of covert Special Operation Forces, and conducting large-scale 
information campaigns to spread deceitful information, Russia’s intensions were clear to 
the West. While some saw this as a completely unexpected event that shattered the notions 
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of the relatively peaceful post-Cold War era, Russia’s invasion, in fact, was another piece 
of evidence that the country had a very different understanding about the indivisibility of 
security (Monaghan 2014). Russia’s actions in Ukraine did not speak of an intention to 
use similar strategies against any NATO allies, but it did make it clear that Russia was 
attempting to restore its great power posture and had the political willingness to use 
military force to defend its interests that it claimed NATO was encroaching on (Van 
Bruusgard 2016, 7-8). 
In 2015, Russia entered the conflict in Syria, demonstrating its conventional capabilities 
by bringing to bear a range of offensive and defensive air capabilities, as well as air- and 
sea-based precision strike weapons (Van Bruusgaard 2016, 19). In 2009, 2013, and 2017, 
Russia conducted the Zapad large-scale military exercises, in which, among other things, 
Russia’s armed forces have simulated invasions of the Baltic States. 
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in particular made it apparent that Russia under the 
leadership of Vladimir Putin was a threat to the whole Alliance. However, the potential 
threat to NATO Allies on the Eastern flank was bigger than to any other countries. The 
Baltic States are vulnerable to Russian aggression due to their geography, small sizes, 
Russia’s snap exercises, as well as the Russian doctrine that considers the “NATO 
infrastructure” bordering Russia a threat, and sees the Baltic States as an area that belongs 
to what Russia conceives as its ‘sphere of influence’ (Bonds et al. 2017, 92; Chivvis et al. 
2017). As Veebel put it, “The Baltic countries clearly constitute Russia’s point of contact 
with NATO and are, therefore, also subject to the interests of Russia to test mutual 
capabilities and to send strategic messages to the Alliance” (2018, 2).  
In 2016, the RAND Corporation published a much-cited report in which the authors 
David Shlapak and Michael Johnson illuminate the disparity of conventional forces in the 
Baltic Sea region. The report compared ground forces and air combat forces of NATO in 
the Baltic States with those of Russia in its Western Military District (WMD), and 
concluded that with its existing posture, it is not clear that NATO could successfully 
defend the Baltic States.  
The report argued that while NATO should be able to deploy several brigades of light 
infantry to the Baltics relatively quickly (for instance, airlifting the 82nd Airborne 
Division in North Carolina to the Baltics would take up to 72 hours), transporting armored 
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forces to the theater would take several weeks, as they would have to be conveyed from 
the U.S. (Shlapak and Johnson 2016, 8; Howard 2016). This means that NATO would be 
in a very difficult position to engage with Russia’s force units which are motorized or 
mechanized, and include tank units, meaning Russia could hope to achieve a swift victory 
in merely three days (Shlapak and Johnson 2016, 5,7).  
As Shlapak and Johnson argue, a fait accompli situation in the Baltic States would leave 
NATO with very difficult choices. Their estimation for a military force to deny Russia’s 
swift victory and therefore deter it from aggression to the Baltic States is “having a force 
of about seven brigades, including three heavy armored brigades – adequately supported 
by airpower, land-based fires, and other enablers on the ground and ready to fight at the 
onset of hostilities,” (2016, 1-2). While assessments about the proper size of such force 
differ, this RAND study played an important role in igniting an active (public) debate on 
conventional force misbalance in the Baltic Sea region.  
 
2.1 Capabilities of Russia, the Baltic States and NATO   
Russia’s Armed Forces and Security Strategy  
The strength of Russia’s Armed Forces is considerable: according to some estimates, in 
2018, Russia’s military strength ranked second in the world, boasting more than 1 million 
active personnel, a total of more than 3.5 million military personnel, supported by 3,914 
aircraft, 20,300 combat tanks, 27,400 armored fighting vehicles and much else (Global 
Firepower 2018). While Russia’s capabilities are significant, the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute estimates that in 2017, Russia’s military expenditure was $66 
billion, while that of the United States was $609 billion (SIPRI 2018), indicating a 
difference of magnitude.  
Keir Giles argues that while making solid assessments about Russia’s military power is 
difficult, and it might be the case that Western experts tend to overestimate Russia’s 
military power, it is clear that, “in terms of equipment, experience, attitude, confidence, 
and more, the Russian military is a radically different force from the one that began the 
process of transformation in 2008,” (2017, 1). Particularly in Ukraine and Syria, Russia 
has made it clear that it is does not hesitate to use military force, and sees these operations 
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as an opportunity to acquire “priceless combat experience” (Valeriy Gerasimov quoted in 
Sokolsky 2017, 3). 
These developments are in line with Russia’s National Security Strategy, presented by 
President Vladimir Putin on December 31, 2015. As Oliker put it, the Strategy “presents 
a Russia focused on increasing its influence and prestige and cementing its national unity; 
a Russia that believes that it is accomplishing its aims, but which simultaneously feels 
threatened by the United States and its allies” (2016). International prestige of Russia 
took a hit when Russia’s unimpressive and defective military capabilities were revealed 
during the war in Georgia, and this has largely inspired the subsequent military build-up, 
including several large-scale regular and snap exercises such as Zapad 2009, 2013 and 
2017, that often involve all components and services of Russia’s armed forces.  
Over the past decade, Russia has considerably improved its command structures, 
personnel, and hardware, the forces are in a higher readiness and “more effectively 
organized, better trained and equipped,” (Sokolsky 2017, 7). Nonetheless, considering 
the significant disparity of the overall capabilities of Russia and NATO, it is clear that 
Russia is unable to engage with such adversaries in all domains. Russia’s strategic-
deterrence concept is designed around this deficiency, and by adopting it, “Russia may 
be seeking to reduce the likelihood of a war by trying to actively influence the adversary 
in a number of domains at once,” (Van Bruusgaard 2016, 20). Another facet of Russia’s 
response to the reality of “overall technological lag” is Russia’s increasing focus on 
various niche capabilities, particularly ones that have not received much attention by the 
U.S. and its allies (Sokolsky 2017, 5). 
 
Armed Forces of the Baltic States 
While it is likely to be an overstatement that the Baltic States “have historically operated 
on the assumption that they are simply too small to deter aggression on their own—or 
even collectively,” (Chevvis et al. 2016, 116),  it is clear that the armed forces of the three 
countries are marginal compared to those of Russia. The Baltic States rely on NATO 
Allies for their defense, but the role of indigenous forces is crucial particularly in the early 
phases of a conflict, as well as in providing situational awareness and local expertise for 
any element of Allied forces. As an important symbolic milestone, in 2018, all three 
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countries are expected to spend more than two percent of GDP on defense. For Estonia 
and Latvia, this means an annual expenditure of €524 and €576 million, respectively, for 
Lithuania the number is €873 million (Harper, Lawrence and Sakkov 2018, 4).  
As can be judged from the budget sizes, the military capabilities of the Baltic States, both 
in terms of equipment and personnel, are relatively modest. Figure 3 demonstrates the 
sizes of the armed forces of the three Baltic States and Poland. The latter is added to 
provide a comparative perspective and describe the size of the armed forces of one of the 
biggest country in the region.  
Figure 3: Comparative Sizes of the Armed Forces of the Baltic States and Poland (2014) 
Country  Total Active Army Air Force Navy Reserve 
Component 
Estonia 5,750 5,300 250 200 30,000 
Latvia 5,310 1,250 310 550 7,850 
Lithuania 11,800 8,150 950 500 6,700 
Poland 99,300 48,200 16,600 7,700 n/a 
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), quoted in Chivvis et al./RAND 
Corporation 2017, 1. 
The comparative data from Figure 3 shows that the indigenous forces of the Baltic States 
are small, and for the purposes of this thesis, it is also important to consider the proportion 
of air force in the overall force structure. As the data suggests, the defense structures of 
the three Baltic States are heavily focused on the land component, leaving navies and air 
forces far behind in terms of personnel (and relevant equipment).    
 
NATO’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014  
The security of the Baltic States relies heavily on security guarantees given by NATO. In 
the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, just as important as closely tracking and 
analyzing the events that followed, was unifying NATO to properly respond to the 
challenges it faced – particularly on its Eastern flank.  
NATO was not well-placed for a fight against a near-peer enemy, and some argue that 
declining defense budgets of many European countries and the decision of the U.S. to 
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turn more of its attention to Asia and elsewhere made it possible for Russia to be 
proactively engage in areas in which NATO had been dominant (Lasconjarias and Nagy 
2017). Considering that the Alliance had long been focused mostly on conflicts outside 
of Europe and seen as a crisis manager, the range of initiatives that NATO took on since 
2014 amounted to “re-discovering the lost art of conventional and nuclear deterrence, 
territorial defense and conventional warfare,” (Osinga 2017).  
In April 2014, among NATO’s first reactions to the Ukraine crisis were suspending all 
practical cooperation with Russia and offering more fighters to take part of the Baltic Air 
Policing Mission (Euractiv). At the Wales Summit in September 2014, the Readiness 
Action Plan (RAP) was approved, and this meant the creation of the Very High Readiness 
Joint Task Force (VJTF) to augment the NATO Response Force (NRF) Concept and to 
reassure NATO members (Schmidt 2016, 76). The VJTF consisted of 5,000 troops, and 
provided the initial capability to better prepare NATO to deal with a potential Russia’s 
invasion of NATO’s Eastern flank.  
However, as Lasconjarias and Nagy argue, in addition to amassing capabilities to address 
Russia’s A2/AD challenge,  “producing sufficient political will among NATO members 
to uphold and, if strategically needed, escalate the mission,” was one of NATO’s tasks 
(2017; Howard 2016). The small size of the force, and the complicated decision-making 
to deploy it were also pointed out as limitations to the deterrent effect of VJTF (Allers 
2017, 25).  
In many ways, the Wales Summit was a landmark for Allies. For one, investing in defense 
and burden sharing was taken more seriously. In February 2016, NATO Secretary 
General Jens Stoltenberg said to a reporter “Our deterrence is based on this combination 
of forward presence combined with a strong ability to reinforce if needed,” indicating that 
NATO was adopting a new model that was an upgrade from the Cold War era thinking 
(NATO 2016b; Allers 2017, 23).  
However, by July 2016 the condition of NATO-Russia relations had not improved 
significantly, and at the Warsaw Summit, NATO heads of state and government took the 
decision to “establish an enhanced forward presence (eFP) in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 
and Poland to unambiguously demonstrate, as part of our overall posture, Allies' 
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solidarity, determination, and ability to act by triggering an immediate Allied response to 
any aggression” (NATO 2016a).  
The four battalion-sized battlegroups were to become operational in the in early 2017. 
Led by the framework nations and operated on a “voluntary, sustainable, and rotational 
basis,” the battlegroups were designed to operate together with national forces of the 
Baltic States and Poland, and being “underpinned by a viable reinforcement strategy” 
(NATO 2016a). Figure 4 shows the composition of the eFP Multinational Battlegroups 
as of February 2018.   
Figure 4: NATO Enhanced Forward Presence as of February 2018 
 
Source: NATO “Boosting NATO’s presence in the east and southeast” 2 March 2018 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm  
The Warsaw Summit was a success mostly because it showed the ability of the Alliance 
to come together and reach unity. However, the discussions over the proper deterrence 
posture of NATO on the Eastern flank of the Alliance continue. Considering Russia’s 
capabilities in the region, it is clear that the eFP battlegroups will not have much impact 
on the conventional balance that is still heavily skewed in favor of Russia.  
Several experts have expressed hope that the U.S. could take further steps in strengthening 
the deterrence posture of NATO in the Baltic Sea region. The U.S. played an important 
role in making possible the creation of the eFP battlegroups, and despite the (initial) 
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concern of the Baltic States over the rhetoric of Donald Trump on the value of NATO, 
the country has taken positive steps from the perspective of NATO’s European Allies. 
Washington’s decision to increase its military presence in Europe signifies a major 
change of policy, especially as the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) included “the 
rotational deployment of an armored brigade to Europe and the prepositioning of heavy 
material for additional forces,” (Allers 2017, 23). While an important step forward, 
Marmei and White, among others, argue that the U.S. should consider going beyond that 
and using the framework of the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) to pre-position 
“meaningful military equipment and ammunition in each of the Baltic states,” arguing 
that only then it can be sure that the equipment will be at the right place already in the 
early phases of conflict (2017, 4).   
While the eFP unquestionably strengthens the deterrence and defense posture of the Baltic 
states (and Poland), there is work to be done to fully integrate battlegroups in NATO’s 
strategy and operational plans in a way that maximizes the strength and the deterrent value 
of the multinational battalions (Luik and Praks 2017, 11). Former SACEUR Gen. (ret). 
Philip Breedlove has made a related point, arguing, “While significant, the battlegroups 
in themselves are insufficient without additional enablers, sufficient forward logistics, 
robust command and control, reinforcement arrangements, and planning and capabilities 
for the air and maritime domain,” (2018).  
The Warsaw Summit Communiqué indicated that the eFP battlegroups are “underpinned 
by a viable reinforcement strategy,” however, there are questions to be asked about the 
credibility of such (NATO 2016a). Considering the difficulty of rapid reinforcement in a 
contested environment, it is likely that strategy itself does not suffice – pre-positioned 
equipment and clear contingency plans that are exercised, are also required.  
It is the premise of this thesis is that airpower can help strengthen NATO’s deterrence 
and defense posture in the Baltic States through supporting NATO’s reinforcement 
efforts. The next section of this chapter lays the groundwork for this by comparing and 
contrasting the airpower capabilities of NATO and the Baltic States, as well as Russia.  
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2.2 The Air Dimension: Capabilities of NATO and Russia 
 “Airpower emerged as ‘the Western way of war’ when it became 
apparent that it was a very potent tool that could be used without 
entailing massive civilian casualties, and in a way that would allow 
the Western powers to control the measure of collateral damage to 
civilian infrastructure.” --- Frans Osinga in “European Security 
and the Significance of the F-35” (2017)  
 
Airpower capabilities of NATO and the Baltic States   
NATO has been very successful in conducting different air campaigns during its out-of-
area missions during the past several decades. For instance, the Alliance demonstrated its 
force in the Persian Gulf War, with the precision-guided weapons being featured in 
televised films, and, as Pape put it, “feeding the perception that a technological revolution 
has made it possible to win wars with airpower alone,” (1996, 211). For almost forty 
years, the United States and NATO enjoyed a de facto monopoly on precision-strike 
weapons, which gave the U.S. and its allies “global freedom of movement and unfettered 
access to pretty much any theater or region in the world,” in a way making the U.S. and 
NATO take for granted its dominance in the air domain (Simon 2017). 
While the supremacy of NATO in terms of sheer numbers of military aircraft is 
unquestionable, Europe has disinvested in its air forces and NATO is largely reliant on 
the capabilities of the United States. For instance, during operation Allied Force in 
Kosovo in 1999, “US forces catered for 60 percent of all sorties, dropped 80 percent of 
all expended ordnance, provided 70 percent of all support sorties and 90 percent of all 
suppression of enemy’s air defense (SEAD) and electronic warfare (EW) missions,” 
underlining the limitations of European air forces in a broad range of air tasks and 
capabilities, including the critical control and command capability (Osinga 2017).  
These trends have continued into the early 2000s and thereafter. In 2011, NATO’s 
operation in Libya was a test for European NATO Allies, as the mission was driven by 
the UK and France, with the U.S. assuming an uncommonly subordinate role. While 
generally a success, the operation once again revealed the deficiencies in the airpower 
capabilities of European states. As Erlanger put it, “Only eight of the 28 allies engaged 
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in combat, and most ran out of ammunition, having to buy, at cost, ammunition stockpiled 
by the United States. Germany refused to take part, even in setting up a no-fly zone,” 
(2011).   
One of the conclusions of the airpower discussions at the NATO Warsaw Summit in 2016 
was that Allies need to “significantly improve the readiness, deployability and 
sustainability of existing air forces and air bases,” (Binnendijk 2016, 36). Some argue that 
Europe’s military gap to a large extent is an airpower gap, as “nine out of sixteen NATO 
capability priority shortfall areas relate to airpower” (Osinga 2017). 
The news does not get much better when zooming in and looking at the capabilities of the 
Baltic States. Considering the small sizes of the countries, the defense budgets of the three 
Baltic States do not allow for developing almost any air combat capability, and puts limits 
on various other airpower tasks. All of the three countries possess a very limited number 
of small transport aircraft and helicopters, Lithuania currently possesses one L-39ZA 
Albatros, which is used only for training (Chivvis et al. 2017, 176).  
 
Air defense of the Baltic States  
While precision-strike and air-to-air combat capabilities fulfill a significant function and 
traditionally receive a lot of attention, airpower roles such as counter air, air mobility, and 
contribution to ISR – often provided through land-based equipment – are just as 
important. In September 2017, Estonian Defense Minister Jüri Luik said that air defense, 
including the development of mid- and long-range capability is “a critical capability gap” 
in the Baltic Sea region (ERR News 2017).  
This point has also been made by the Defense Ministers of Lithuania and Latvia, as well 
as in various think tank reports and articles (Coffey and Kochis 2017; Conley, Rathke and 
Melino 2018; Breedlove 2018; Harper, Lawrence and Sakkov 2018). Air defense was 
among the topics discussed by the Baltic Presidents during their visit to the White House 
in April 2018. Figure 5 explains the current air defense capabilities of the Baltic States, 
while distinguishing between different formats in which certain capabilities are provided. 
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Figure 5: Current Air Defense Capabilities of the Baltic States 
Format Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, 
Intelligence, Surveillance, 
Reconnaissance (C4ISR) 
Ground-based air 
defense (GBAD) 
Air 
NATO  
● NATO Integrated Air and 
Missile Defence System 
(NATINAMDS)  
● NATO Air Command and 
Control System (ACCS)/ 
ACCS Software Based Element 
(ASBE)  
● Airborne Warning and Control 
System (AWACS)  
● Deployments and 
exercises 
● Baltic Air 
Policing1  
● Deployments 
and exercises  
Baltic tri-
national 
● Baltic Air Surveillance 
Network (BALTNET)  
---  --- 
Individual 
Baltic 
States 
● Surveillance radars  ● Legacy anti-
aircraft guns 
● Very short-range 
missile defense 
systems 
VSHORAD  
--- 
Source: Harper, Lawrence and Sakkov 2018, 10.  
 
As Figure 5 suggests, the current air defense capabilities of the Baltic States are rather 
limited. BALTNET, a co-operation created for the “acquisition, co-ordination, 
distribution and display of air surveillance data within the three Baltic states,” is currently 
the only undertaking carried out collectively by the three states (Estonian Defense Forces 
2012; MoD of Latvia). An important part of it is the jointly operated Combined Control 
and Reporting Centre (CRC) which is located in Karmėlava in Lithuania, and “provides 
a tactical airspace command and control (C2) element,“ (Harper, Lawrence and Sakkov 
2018, 12; Chivvis et al. 2017, 176-177).  
In terms of ground-based assets, at the moment, the Baltic States rely almost entirely on 
short-range (SHORAD) missile defense systems. The MBDA Mistral and Raytheon 
Stinger systems in Estonia and Latvia, respectively, provide point defense. Latvia has 
announced its plan to procure medium-range air defense systems; in Lithuania, the 
                                                 
1
 Baltic Air Policing is strictly a peacetime mission and does not provide air defense  
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acquisition of Kongsberg Norwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System 
(NASAMS) are underway (Harper, Lawrence and Sakkov 2018, 12). Ground-based air 
defense systems owned by the U.S. have occasionally been deployed to the Baltics, for 
instance, the Patriot battery was deployed to Lithuania for an exercise, and its launcher 
brought to Estonia for its centenary celebrations in February 2018 (ERR News 2018a). 
Since 2004, NATO has conducted the Baltic Air Policing Mission, a peacetime collective 
defense mission with the goal to safeguard the integrity of the airspace of the NATO 
members. The mission is carried out under the NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defense 
System (NATINAMDS), and there is a system in place that ensures 24/7 air policing, 
“within SACEUR’s area of responsibility,” for countries that lack the necessary airpower 
capabilities (NATO Allied Air Command). However, it is important to note that the Baltic 
Air Policing is strictly a peacetime mission and the tasks that are undertaken in the 
framework of the mission are limited.    
The mission was initially based at Šiauliai Air Base in Lithuania, and considerably 
upgraded in 2014 and 2015. The number of fighters grew from four to 16, and besides 
Šiauliai, aircraft were stationed at Ämari air base in Estonia (Chivvis et al. 2017, 132). 
Since 2015, the mission consists of eight fighters, and is undertaken by Allies on a 
rotational basis with every detachment being in charge of the mission for three months at 
a time. The U.S., most notably, has occasionally deployed additional aircraft to the region, 
including two fifth generation attack aircraft F-35A in April 2017 (US Air Forces in 
Europe and Air Forces Africa 2017). Latvia renovated its Lielvārde air base in 2014, it 
does not host the Baltic Air Policing Mission, but is used for trainings on a regular basis 
(Chivvis et al. 2017, 154).  
 
Airpower capabilities of Russia 
Russia’s Air Force has recovered from the low-point it hit after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1990s. Mirroring the transformation of Russia’s armed forces in general, 
Russia’s air capabilities have undergone significant improvements since 2008. Currently, 
the country is replacing some of the Soviet-era jets with very capable new aircraft such 
as the Su-30SMs, Su-35Ss. However, given the sorry state of the Russian economy, the 
Air Force cannot acquire these capabilities at once, and replacing all of the Soviet-era 
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planes will take many years. Similarly, while Russia has significantly improved its 
precision-strike capability, the availability of these weapons is currently quite low 
(Majumdar 2016). 
 Nonetheless, Russia has used its new aircraft in Syria and elsewhere, and has also learned 
various lessons in the war in Ukraine. As Giles argues, “analysis of the use and limitations 
of airpower in Ukraine has led Russia to focus on development of all-weather 
reconnaissance capabilities with real-time delivery of information, standoff precision 
weapons systems, and armed heavy UAVs” (2017, 7). Russia is working on its first fifth-
generation aircraft Su-57 (previously known as T-50/PAK FA). The lack of an aircraft 
that could engage with stealth aircraft such as F-35s on an equal footing is currently a 
capability gap for which Russia is hoping to compensate by a much higher replacement 
rate (Giles 2017, 8).  
The concentration of Russia’s advanced aircraft is particularly high in its Western 
Military District (WMD) close the Baltic Sea region, which currently boasts 27 combat 
air squadrons and six battalions of assault helicopters (Sokolsky 2017, 6). In 2016, NATO 
recorded a total of 780 incidents in which NATO intercepted Russian military aircraft 
(Dearden 2017). Countries around the Baltic Sea experience Russian aircraft violating 
their airspace, often flying without transponders or ignoring flight control officials.  
 
Russia’s A2/AD capabilities  
Following the traditions of the extensive Soviet missile enterprise, Russia continues to 
invest in and develop a broad range of missiles that can undertake missions ranging from 
the creating A2/AD in local conflicts to delivering strategic nuclear weapons across the 
globe (CSIS Missile Defense Project). Russia’s air defense capabilities include long-
range Russian anti-air missile systems S-300 and S-400; it deploys short-range offensive 
ballistic missile systems as the SS-26 or Iskander for a land-based strike; and uses sea-
based systems such as SS-N-30A Kalibr-type cruise missiles, and SS-N-27 Sizzler anti-
ship missiles (Williams 2017). As Figure 6 demonstrates, the engagement ranges of these 
capabilities reach far into the territories of the Baltic States.  
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Figure 6: Russia's A2/AD Capabilities in the Baltic Sea Region 
 
Source: Harper, Lawrence, and Sakkov 2018, 3. 
 
Russia’s A2/AD capabilities present NATO with a multidimensional challenge that 
restricts the freedom of movement of air, maritime, and land forces alike. The Iskander 
ballistic missile system, for example, is capable of carrying both a conventional and 
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nuclear warhead, and it has an estimated range of 400-500km (Howard 2016). Perhaps 
even a bigger threat to the states in the countries in the Baltic Sea region is posed by 
Russia’s new and very capable S-400 anti-aircraft systems which comes with associated 
sensors and command and control (C2), and can target aircraft within a 400km radius. 
While the systems can reach their full potential in terms of range only in ideal 
circumstances and therefore the numbers could be much shorter in most situations, a few 
hundred kilometers is a very long distance considering the small size of the Baltic States. 
This is true particularly given that Russia has employed several of these systems in 
Kaliningrad – the Russian territory crammed between Lithuania and the Baltic Sea 
(Sokolsky 2017, 7; Breedlove 2018, 2).  
 
A2/AD in Russia’s Military Strategy   
“Non-Western militaries have been continuously observing and adapting 
to the manner in which Western militaries apply their advantages in 
technology, weapons, training and doctrine. In time, they have been able 
to adapt their policies and defences. This adaptation reveals itself in many 
forms; certainly the most prominent adaptation lies within Anti-Access 
(A2) and Area Denial (AD) spaces” --- Mehmet Yalinalp in “Air 
Operations in Contested Environments” (2016).  
 
Lasconjarias and Nagy explain Russia’s aptitude for missiles by arguing “Because 
ballistic and cruise missiles are relatively easy to acquire and operate, but difficult to 
defend against, they provide the backbone of any good A2/AD strategy,” (2017). 
Essentially, Russia is trying to fully exploit the tools it possesses by setting up A2/AD 
systems aiming at “denying the possibility of an operationally superior adversary 
maximizing its combat power by keeping him at bay” (Van Bruusgaard 2015, 9; 
Lasconjarias and Nagy 2017).  
Considering the prolonged success of Western force projection enabled by prompt global 
strike capabilities, high mobility and well-integrated C2 capabilities, it was clear that non-
Western powers were finding ways to come up with a worthy response to such domination 
(Schmidt 2016, 77; Van Bruusgaard 2015, 10; Oliker 2016). Modern ballistic missiles are 
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GPS guided, very precise, and well-fitted to create highly contested environments, and 
“rain into forward bases and deny force projection and posturing,” making it much more 
difficult for NATO to operate in the way it has become accustomed to (Yalinalp 2016; 
Sokolsky 2016, 6).  
This ties into Russia’s national self-confidence, its effort to elevate its standing it the 
world, be treated as an equal, and demonstrate its capabilities to indicate that the trend of 
NATO’s Eastward enlargement – which it sometimes blames on its projected weakness 
and negligence – has been reversed. As a demonstration of this, “Moscow has now 
developed concentrated zones of defence capabilities that are aligned with the historical 
vision of Russia – that is the motherland at the core of its buffer zones,” (Lasconjarias 
and Nagy 2017). 
While it is possible that the central idea of Russia’s A2/AD capability is “based 
predominantly upon authentic defensive philosophical underpinnings,” it is not very 
likely (Lasconjarias and Nagy 2017). Schmidt argues that due to their nuclear deterrent, 
countries like Russia and China face quite a low threat of invasion into their territories. 
In this regard, establishing A2/AD does not make much sense from the standpoint of 
defense of its own territory. Rather, the rationale behind establishing A2/AD could be 
related to the idea of securing a ‘fait accompli’ (2016, 73).  
For Schmidt, this concept “foresees a military plan executed close to their homeland while 
timely, third-party intervention is prevented until the mission is complete. Afterwards, 
when the third party has managed to marshal its conventional intervention force, the 
nuclear deterrent might serve to discourage further encroachment,” (2016, 73). In this 
regard, Russia’s A2/AD capabilities have direct implications for security of the Baltic 
States and Poland, as well as the NATO Alliance as a whole (Lasconjarias and Nagy 
2017). 
While there is a general consensus among experts and politicians that Russia’s A2/AD 
capabilities pose a significant challenge for NATO – a point that is increasingly often 
raised by politicians – there are some who argue that it is wrong to claim that Russia is 
doing something “strategically brilliant and new” (Raitasalo 2017). The critics make the 
case that essentially, A2/AD does not mean much more than deploying modern military 
systems, and that European powers are confusing their inadequacies with Russia’s 
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capabilities (Raitasalo 2017). While this is likely to be an overstatement, it is clear that if 
NATO would have focused more on developing capabilities for high-end warfighting and 
less on expeditionary operations and counterinsurgency, it would be better able to respond 
to Russia’s A2/AD challenge on its own territory (Giles 2017, 5; Lasconjarias and Nagy 
2017).  
 
2.3 Conclusion: NATO’s Current Deterrent Posture in the Baltic States  
“[T]he ‘local’ balance of military power—the balance between the 
conventional forces of the attacker and those of a defender in the 
area of conflict – often plays a critical role in conventional 
deterrence, since it is local forces that will impact an aggressor’s 
calculations regarding a quick victory.” --- Michael Gerson in 
“Conventional Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age” (2009, 38).  
 
Compared to the Cold War era in which it is generally accepted that NATO possessed 
qualitative advantages that essentially ensured its dominance over the Warsaw Pact 
countries even when it was outnumbered, the modern security picture is much more 
complex (Sokolsky 2017, 6). As Yalinalp put it, “The long-term enjoyed benign 
environment has swiftly transformed into an unpermissive, contested environment with 
major challenges and problems, far more problematic than have been seen in recent 
previous conflicts,” (2016). Nonetheless, the overall military capability of NATO 
continues to be superior compared to any other country or military alliance.   
In the air domain, Russia and China are actively challenging the idea that air superiority 
is a theater-wide condition, as well something that the U.S. and NATO are entitled to 
(Grynkewich 2017). The modern day presents a complex environment that is much 
different from the circumstances under which NATO’s operations in countries such as 
Afghanistan and Libya took place. Lasconjarias and Nagy argue that this transition from 
permissive to contested environments is particularly relevant in terms of airpower, still 
“the quickest and smartest way to deploy a first response and project [power],” (2017). 
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The current postures of NATO and Russia in terms of conventional forces in the Baltic 
Sea region make it clear that the military balance, in the short term, strongly favors 
Russia. Even after the establishment of NATO eFP multinational battlegroups in the 
Baltic States and Poland, in an event of a military crisis, NATO is fully reliant on rapid 
reinforcement. The eFP battlegroups in the Baltic States were never designed to 
“represent a sufficient military force to oppose Russia’s armed forces in a lasting and 
escalating conflict,” (Lasconjarias and Nagy 2017). Rather, they constitute a tripwire, a 
confirmation of the commitment of NATO Allies to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.  
NATO’s ability for a rapid reinforcement of its Eastern flank is limited due to 
geographical realities and Russia’s potent A2/AD capability. These circumstances can 
potentially severely undermine NATO’s efforts to deliver follow-on forces and 
equipment either by air, land, or sea. As Gerson put it, “[…] the available evidence 
suggests that overall superiority may be insufficient to establish deterrence. Despite the 
apparent advantage of conventional superiority in the macro sense, deterrence may still 
fail if the opponent believes it has a local advantage,” (2009, 38-39; Veebel 2018, 15). 
Through its A2/AD buildup, Russia is challenging the idea that it would deterred by 
NATO’s current deterrence by punishment posture – and proactively mitigating its value. 
From the standpoint of NATO, it is especially concerning “in the absence of prepared and 
agreed upon contingency plans, backed up by credible and ready forces with sufficient 
authority already delegated to operational and tactical commanders,” and without 
considerable efforts by NATO to exercise (rapid) reinforcement in a contested 
environment (Zapfe 2017; Simon 2017). Russia can use its A2/AD capabilities to try 
achieve a quick victory and to avoid a situation in which any “local conflict,” in the Baltic 
States for instance, would certainly and immediately lead to a “global conflict” between 
Russia and NATO (Simon 2017).  
This signifies a major shortfall of NATO’s current deterrence and defense posture in the 
Baltic States. A2/AD manifests itself in various way in different theaters and 
environments, and in the Baltic States, Russia’s “A2/AD build-up is a decade long and 
precisely tailored geopolitical endeavor” (Lasconjarias and Nagy 2017). It is a thorny 
issue, as NATO must take this challenge seriously and respond in an adequate way, while 
understanding that Russia might use its A2/AD capabilities as “a form of psychological 
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and political warfare” and share misinformation about its capabilities to try to undermine 
the confidence of NATO Baltic members in the Alliance (Simon 2017; Schmidt 2016, 
71). For this reason, it is crucial that NATO’s actions as well as communication regarding 
this issue is well thought through and consistent with the strategic aims of the Alliance.  
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3. Methodology  
This thesis employs qualitative content analysis as the research method. Qualitative 
content analysis is similar to various other qualitative research methods, but it is 
distinguished by most of them by its “predominant use of newly collected data,” (Drisko 
and Maschi 2015, 81). Philipp Mayring coined the term in 1983, and defines it as “a set 
of techniques for the systematic analysis of texts of many kinds addressing not only 
manifest content but also the themes and core ideas found in texts as primary content,” 
(quoted in Drisko and Maschi 2015, 86). Importantly, qualitative content analysis 
considers contextual information and seeks to illuminate latent content that can become 
an important part of the analysis.  
Qualitative analysis, newly collected data, and the importance of contextual information 
besides the primary content are keywords that accurately describe the research undertaken 
to better understand the role of airpower in strengthening NATO’s deterrence and defense 
posture in the Baltic States. This is an under-researched topic, currently, and most of the 
literature available on the topic comes in the form of think tank reports and issue briefs 
published by experts. The theoretical framework of this thesis is made up of a synthesis 
of major works on airpower theory and military and airpower doctrines. In order to lay 
the groundwork for the analysis regarding the security context of the Baltic Sea region, a 
variety of secondary sources were studied, mostly books and journal articles. In order to 
get the most up-to-date data, various newspaper articles and think tanks reports were also 
used. 
In addition to that, twenty expert interviews were conducted. In order to showcase 
different perspectives, the list of interviewees included active and retired military 
personnel as well as civilians with various backgrounds. First and foremost, the added 
value of this thesis lies in its original approach to tackling this timely issue, and providing 
a comprehensive and up-to-date account of the topic through the analysis of original data. 
The author's own contribution is the most evident in Chapter 4 of the thesis as this section 
draws on the data collected and synthesizes it with existing literature.  
Due to the restricted scope of a master’s thesis, this research has several limitations. 
Firstly, the thesis relies only on unclassified information. Secondly, while airpower is 
often also associated with the space and cyber dimensions of warfare, this thesis focuses 
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only on the air dimension, leaving the other two aside. Finally, this thesis does not 
consider the issue of nuclear power and its role in deterrence, as this is a topic of such 
complexity and depth that it could make for a master’s thesis on its own.  
 
3.1 Qualitative Content Analysis and Semi-Structured Interviews  
Research design and sampling in qualitative content analysis 
According to Drisko and Maschi, the model of qualitative content analysis “allows for 
exploring the complexity of communications in ways that may not be possible through 
quantitative analyses,” (2015, 87). Sandelowski and Barroso make a similar argument, 
stating that while qualitative content analysis “clearly describes key meanings within a 
data set,” this approach is also helpful in exploring and identifying “new ways of looking 
at events and communications” (quoted in Drisko and Maschi 2015, 94). This is 
particularly valuable when researching topics that are dynamic and have to do with 
current events. Such complexity is evidently present in, for example, exploring the 
different aspects that may influence the credibility of deterrence – a topic that has strong 
theoretical underpinnings but is also constantly evolving in time.  
The most common way of data collection in qualitative content analysis is personal 
interviews, and this requires decisions about the target group of interviewees. Even 
though sampling in qualitative content analysis has not been extensively assessed by 
scholars, it is worth considering, as “the nature of the sample may strongly affect the 
credibility and applicability of a qualitative content analysis,” (Drisko and Maschi 2015, 
97). In this thesis, the guiding principle in terms of sampling was finding interviewees 
who are knowledgeable about the issue in hand, or as Patton put it, “information rich” 
(quoted in Drisko and Maschi 2015, 98). Clearly defining the target group of interviewees 
in terms of their knowledge about security issues in the Baltic Sea region as well airpower 
was at the basis of the attempt to collect data that would help create new awareness and 
discuss themes central to this study in detail. 
However, considering that defense planning is at the center of this thesis, and this process 
has various stakeholders and influencers, it was important to involve respondents from 
various backgrounds. Military and air force personnel, defense planners, researchers, 
academics and politicians belonged to the target group. It was also important to ensure 
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geographical dispersion in the Baltic Sea region and beyond, and include interviewees 
who have been dealing with these issues not only at a national level, but also in influential 
positions in NATO.  
The interviewees selected are from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Sweden and Finland. The two non-NATO members in the list, Finland 
and Sweden, were included due to the fact that the geography of the Baltic Sea region 
makes these countries very important from the airpower perspective. While interviewing 
representatives of the three Baltic States was important to understand the perspective of 
the locals, it was also crucial to integrate the views of representatives of the U.S. and U.K, 
as these are among the most influential NATO Allies and both retain strong ties with the 
Baltic States.  
Considering the importance of government politicians and parliamentarians in defining 
broader security questions and leading the budget process, hearing their perspective was 
valuable. Due to the quite specific research topic, only politicians who were either 
members of the defense committees of national parliaments or members of the NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly were included on the target list. Eventually, interviews were 
conducted with two out of the five politicians on the target list.  
As previously stated, the main criteria for the other interviewees was their expertise on 
the topic, most often ascertained by their current or previously held positions. The goal 
was to conduct at least 15 interviews, the target list of interviewees originally consisted 
of 26 names. It was not possible to schedule an interview with five persons on the list; 
three persons declined the invitation to be interviewed, but gave suggestions as to people 
from similar backgrounds with whom the researcher could come into contact with. On all 
three occasions, the reason for declining the interview was self-identified lack of 
knowledge on the topic.   
 
Semi-structured interviews  
Drisko and Maschi argue that open-ended questions work best in qualitative content 
analysis, and remark that semi-structured interviews are often used (2015, 102). A semi-
structured interview format was chosen for the research as it is a good way to get readily 
comparable data, but it also leaves room for unrestricted discussions on the issue. As 
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Bryman put it, semi-structured interviewing allows the researcher “keep more of an open 
mind about the contours of what he or she needs to know about, so that concepts and 
theories can emerge out of the data,” (2012, 12). The interviewees received a list of 
preliminary interview questions beforehand, but they were informed that the interview 
was going to be semi-structured, meaning they were welcome to add any additional topics 
or comments, and that they could be asked follow-up questions during the interview.  
The interviewees also received a document with information about the research project 
and the interview itself. This document explained the purpose of the study, the 
approximate duration of the interview (30-45 minutes), and the instruction that the 
interview could be conducted in person, by phone or via Skype. While it was not 
preferred, an option of submitting the responses in a written form was added. On the topic 
of confidentiality, this document stated: 
 “This research relies only on unclassified information. All data collected 
will be secured and kept confidential. No reference will be made that could 
possibly link any individuals to specific statements made in the study. 
Upon your approval, your name will appear on the List of Interviewees at 
the end of the study.”  
The twenty interviewees were also asked whether or not the interview could be recorded 
– only for the use of the researcher. As a result, fifteen of the interviews were recorded. 
Seventeen interviews were in English, while Estonian was used with three respondents. 
Twelve interviews took place in-person, six by phone, and two respondents sent their 
answers in a written form, agreeing to respond to follow-up questions.   
In academic social research, face-to-face interviews continue to be more common and 
preferred over phone interviews; but as phones are a very commonly used tools of 
communication, and so using them for interviews is widely accepted (Bryman 2012, 213). 
Conducting the interviews by phone eliminates the possibility of the researcher being able 
to observe the interviewee. By way of contrast, “in personal interviews, respondents’ 
replies are sometimes affected by characteristics of the interviewer (for example, class, 
ethnicity) and indeed by his or her mere presence (implying that the interviewees may 
reply in ways they feel will be deemed desirable by interviewers).” This potential bias is 
almost fully removed in phone interviews (Bryman 2012, 214). 
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In generating the questions, the guiding principle was that they needed to be as clear as 
possible, in order to obtain “optimally diverse and credible data” (Drisko and Maschi 
2015, 102). The interviews were divided into three blocks: (1) airpower in the Baltic Sea 
region and threats from Russia; (2) defense planning in peacetime; and (3) defense 
planning for a military crisis.  
While the three main topics remained the same, there was a need to distinguish some of 
the questions based on whether the respondent was from a NATO country or from Finland 
or Sweden. Another set of slightly modified questions was created for politicians as their 
schedules are often very tight. However, the general tone of the questions in these three 
categories was very similar in order to maintain the ability to compare data derived from 
the various interviews with respondents.  
The full list of interviewees can be found in Appendix 1, and the preliminary questions 
for the semi-structured interviews in Appendix 2. 
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4. An Analysis of the Central Themes in Strengthening the Deterrence and Defense 
Posture of the Baltic States through NATO’s Airpower 
 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss and analyze the central themes and defense planning 
options in trying to respond to the main research question: “How can NATO use its 
airpower to strengthen its deterrence and defense posture on its Eastern flank and support 
NATO’s reinforcement efforts?” An answer to this question is made up of three main 
topics that all help to explain different aspects of the application of NATO’s airpower in 
the Baltic States and its deterrent and defense posture in Northeastern Europe.  
Airpower has several characteristics that make it suitable for supporting the task of rapid 
reinforcement, and it therefore emerges as an appealing military instrument for defense 
planners. However, as explained in the previous chapters, there are various aspects that 
restrict NATO’s ability to make full use of its air capabilities in order to defend the Baltic 
States. Should Russia undertake the escalatory move of actually using its A2/AD 
capabilities, the Baltic Sea region would become a highly hostile environment for NATO. 
Understanding these dynamics is crucial for defense planning.  
Any decisions that are taken by NATO to protect its member states on the Eastern flank 
will impact the Alliance as a whole. Threat perceptions and ideas about how NATO 
should respond to the A2/AD challenge differ across countries as well as among experts 
and politicians. Understanding and appreciating this complexity is particularly important 
given that NATO has to find a way to strengthen its deterrence and defense posture in the 
Baltic States while protecting its most valuable asset – the unity of the Alliance.  
The deterrence and defense posture of NATO on its Eastern flank, including the issue of 
military mobility and air defense, are currently being discussed at various levels in 
NATO, as well as in national governments, academia and think tank reports. It is a timely 
issue, and the situation is constantly evolving. In order to analyze up-to-date defense 
planning options and possibilities, and better engage with the gray areas that appear in 
the limited amount of literature written on the topic, twenty expert interviews were 
conducted. Interviewees included military personnel and civilians from Estonia, Finland, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Further details 
about the interviews are explained in the previous chapter on methodology. 
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This chapter describes, compares and analyzes the viewpoints of the interviewees, and is 
divided into three main sections:  
 The fight for air superiority and degrading Russia’s A2/AD capabilities  
 Reaching consensus in NATO and the role of bilateral and regional security 
arrangements  
 Choices in further developing NATO airpower in the Baltic Sea region 
 
As per the agreement with the interviewees, none of the statements will be attributed to 
specific individuals. Each subsection summarizes and analyzes interview responses and 
integrates ideas from sources from literature in the field to connect the empirical findings 
with theory, reinforce the opinions of interviewees, and present contrasting viewpoints. 
 
4.1 The Fight for Air Superiority and Degrading Russia’s A2/AD Capabilities 
While there are no indications to show that a military conflict between Russia and NATO 
in the foreseeable future is probable, considering these far-fetched scenarios and possible 
NATO responses are important from the standpoint of deterrence. This helps explain the 
heart of the A2/AD challenge, the first part of this section. The section will then consider 
degrading A2/AD capabilities, finally talk about pre-positioning (additional) forces and 
equipment to the Baltic States.  
Russia’s A2/AD capabilities  
To start with, several interviewees noted that they “do not like the term A2/AD,” as it 
means different things for different people. As explained in the first chapter, this is a 
shortfall and causes unnecessary confusion for people dealing with this topic. Schmidt, 
among others has argued that it is important to create new definitions for new 
technologies, and that the NATO doctrine should be updated to better reflect “the highly 
integrated joint and combined processes needed in countering A2/AD,” (2016, 77).  
There was a general agreement among the interviewees that this topic is important and 
Russia’s A2/AD capabilities are potent, and pose a threat to NATO. While a certain 
amount of Russia’s rhetoric about its air (and generally military) capabilities is “smoke 
and mirrors,” as one interviewee put it, several experts noted that Russia has heavily 
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invested in air defense systems while most other countries have degraded or not 
developed their corresponding capabilities. 
Most assessments by experts of Russia’s A2/AD capabilities in the Baltic Sea region 
included words such as “very real”, “capable”, and “formidable”.  The Kaliningrad 
enclave and Russia’s S-400 and Iskander missile systems were often identified as a major 
problem. There were also some interviewees who saw this as a lesser problem, arguing, 
“Russia’s A2/AD is like a scarecrow on the field – frightening in the beginning, but it 
actually can be handled.” Another interlocutor claimed, “I don’t want to accept when 
people say that Russia has a very strong airpower and A2/AD. It is a problem, but it is 
something that the air force is trained to deal with.” The possibility of neutralizing 
Russia’s A2/AD capabilities came up in almost every interview, with one interviewee 
putting it bluntly, “One can argue that best anti air-defense asset is an attack which goes 
and destroys that S-400,” admitting that it is not an easy undertaking.   
 
The fight for air superiority  
The presence of A2/AD capabilities strongly impacts the fight for air superiority – the 
freedom to use airspace for one’s purposes while denying this right to an opponent. There 
was a consensus that air superiority in the Baltic Sea region for either side would be 
limited in time and space, and, understandably, depend on the specific scenario.  
In broad terms, however, several interviewees argued that in the case of a conventional 
conflict, Russia would “use all its advantages to gain operational initiative.” The 
equipment it has put in place in areas in the region most likely means Russia would have 
the initiative. Some interviewees thought that air superiority will not achievable – at least 
in the beginning phase – for either side. “Russia can park its assets along the [NATO-
Russia] border, but […] [NATO] can bring in F-35s, which can enter the theater quickly 
and respond rapidly,” one interviewee argued, indicating it is likely to result in an 
impasse.  
Several interviewees were more optimistic, arguing that NATO is likely to achieve air 
superiority “reasonably quickly”. One respondent argued that NATO should have more 
confidence in its abilities to deal with Russia A2/AD, claiming, “Everybody is so afraid 
of it [Russia’s A2/AD capability], but take out one of the assets that it is composed of, 
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and you’re already degrading it, lessening its strength. When one of these is out, the rest 
will fall. NATO can do a lot of things in Kaliningrad.” 
There are, indeed, several ways in which NATO could neutralize Russia’s A2/AD 
capability and achieve air superiority in the region. An interviewee argued, “[…] it 
doesn’t have to be the conventional, Cold War thinking that suppression of enemy air 
defense (SEAD) is the only option. There has to be some of that, but there is more 
available,” referring, among other things, to electronic warfare (EW) and cyber 
operations. However, it is crucial to understand the seriousness of any missions that aim 
to degrade Russia’s A2/AD capability, and consider the underlying consequences. 
As one respondent put it, “Achieving air superiority [in the Baltic Sea region] would only 
possible if you strike targets in Russian territory, and this means full-scale war.” Other 
interviewees agreed that this would be “a bloody battle” and “get nasty”. Another 
interviewee considered the situation equally difficult, arguing, “we [NATO] would need 
to buy favorable air situation by offering quite some planes and pilots. This is what it will 
take to start to degrade Russia’s ability to use ground-based assets.” 
This is in agreement with the conclusions of several experts who have written on this 
topic. Tangredi argues that counter–anti-access efforts are inherently more difficult than 
keeping up an anti-access operation, as “ultimately the goal of the counter–anti-access 
force is to strike at the vital center of the enemy and cause his capitulation,” illuminating 
the magnitude of such fight (2013, 16; 75-76). Some military experts have estimated that 
when attempting to neutralize the A2/AD set-up in the Kaliningrad Oblast, a potential 
aircraft attrition rate would be 20-30 percent (Schmidt 2016, 71-72).  
Several respondents claimed that NATO has what it takes to undertake these missions. 
One interviewee argued, “Mr. Putin understands that should Western air power precision 
long-range precision be brought to bear, that A2AD can be brought down […]. Western 
airpower can hold Russia at risk if it chooses to intercede, it can also hold him [President 
Putin] at risk at his homeland.” The respondent claimed that NATO’s unquestionable 
long-term superiority over Russia in air assets is an important part of NATO’s deterrent 
that helps keep the country away from doing anything that could cross the Article 5 
threshold. 
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Some respondents made the case that while, militarily, NATO has the capability to 
achieve and maintain air superiority in the Baltic Sea region, the central question is about 
the political will of the Allies. One respondent argued, “If the alliance wished, it could 
deliver all capabilities.” Another interlocutor claimed, “I do believe that if NATO chose 
to establish first local air superiority in a dedicated process, yes, it could do it. It would 
not be easy, not as easy as it was in Iraq or other places, but the full force of NATO air 
force brought to bear in defending NATO soil […]” would attain this goal. The idea of 
political will is important and will be further explained in section about reaching 
consensus in NATO.  
Pre-positioning forces and equipment to the Baltic States  
While NATO’s overall military capabilities are very substantial, a majority of 
interviewees expressed concern over the readiness of NATO forces to undertake high-
end airpower missions in the Baltic Sea region. Several interviewees argued that NATO’s 
current posture in the Baltics is not adequate, and the Alliance is currently “far from 
organized [enough]” to be able to take on missions to establish air superiority. According 
to one respondent, NATO’s capability shortfalls are apparent across the spectrum of 
airpower tasks and includes reconnaissance, targeting, and degrading.  
The Warsaw Summit Communique states, “We will not accept to be constrained by any 
potential adversary as regards the freedom of movement of Allied forces by land, air, or 
sea to and within any part of Alliance territory” (NATO 2016a), but it is not clear if the 
Alliance has the capabilities to ensure that. This constitutes a credibility-of-commitment 
issue, as Mearsheimer defines it, referring to a situation where the promised response is 
not credible (1985, 18). In this case, the reason for it is the lack of exercised contingency 
plans and prepositioned equipment.  
However, there are very different understandings in the Alliance regarding what NATO 
should do to solve the credibility-of-commitment issue and lower the risk of conflict with 
Russia. The respondents were divided into two camps: those arguing that Russia respects 
strength over weakness and NATO should take bold actions, and those who argued 
NATO should refrain from any actions that the Kremlin could interpret as escalatory. 
As one interviewee argued, “There’s the sentiment that maybe one or other NATO’s step 
is too much for Russia, but whatever we [NATO] will do, Russia will protest and do 
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something crazy. So why not do what we want?” Along the same lines, a respondent 
added that NATO should only worry about its capabilities that help to deter and defend 
the Baltics, “[NATO] should not play along with Russia’s game.” This view is shared by 
several other experts, arguing, “Since NATO is a defensive alliance, NATO should reject 
any criticism of defensive measures as escalatory,” (Gorenc 2016, 96). With its actions 
in Ukraine and elsewhere, Russia has violated the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act 
(Praks and Stoicescu 2016, 27), which some interpret as giving NATO even more 
freedom to preposition in the Baltics any number of troops and equipment it deems 
necessary.  
By the way of contrast, some interviewees repeatedly raised the issue of provoking 
Russia, and argued for making sure that NATO does not undertake actions that could be 
described by Russia as escalatory and thereby be used for domestic political purposes. 
For instance, an interviewee argued, “NATO’s response has to be proportionate. 
Reassurance and deterrence two sides of one coin, but the third side is provocation.” 
Similarly, a respondent claimed, “NATO is doing a fairly good job of providing 
deterrence, while not crossing the line of provocation,” making the case that there some 
NATO’s actions that are meant to bolster its security, could, in fact, play in the hands of 
Russia and the Putin’s regime. 
In summary, both the experts interviewed and preexisting literature on the subject suggest 
that Russia’s A2/AD capabilities are very real and formidable. Those capabilities strongly 
influence the fight for the air superiority in the Baltic Sea region, and make it very difficult 
to achieve for NATO. While the respondents were in agreement that the A2/AD elements 
can be dealt with, there was a slight divergence regarding their opinions on how difficult 
and dangerous this would be.  
While NATO’s capability gap in terms of readiness and pre-positioned equipment in 
Baltic States was recognized by most respondents, there were contrasting views on how 
this credibility-of-commitment issue should be dealt with. For some, the obvious answer 
was deploying more troops and pre-positing more equipment to the Baltics, while the 
others considered it prudent not to undertake any actions that Russia could consider 
provocative.  
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4.2 Reaching Consensus in NATO and the Role of Bilateral and Regional Security 
Arrangements 
 
Finding consensus among Allies and going through the NATO decision-making process 
in a reasonable amount of time were among the main concerns raised by the interviewees 
with the regard to NATO’s ability to degrade Russia’s A2/AD capabilities.  
There was a consensus among interviewees that in the long-run, NATO’s airpower 
capability far outlasts that of Russia, but it is not clear if the Alliance would achieve a 
consensus about the proper response in the case of a crisis erupting. This occasional 
gloominess of how NATO’s decision-making processes may weaken the deterrence 
posture of the Alliance is reflected in literature on the topic. In the line of the arguments 
of several interviewees, Lasconjarias and Nagy consider “producing sufficient political 
will among NATO members to uphold and, if strategically needed, escalate the mission,” 
a major task for the Alliance in responding to Russia’s challenge (Lasconjarias and Nagy 
2017; Howard 2016). 
This section will analyze reaching consensus in NATO for its past decisions, consider the 
importance of bilateral agreements between the Baltic States, and the U.S., most 
prominently; and finally, look at regional arrangements to analyze the role of Sweden and 
Finland. These are two non-NATO countries with a geographical location that makes 
them very important for applying airpower in the Baltic States.   
Reaching consensus in NATO  
There was a general agreement that NATO’s steps in 2014 and onwards have been useful. 
One interviewee argued, “The situation has improved dramatically since 2014, because 
of the way NATO has responded, […] the decisions that were taken were exactly what 
was needed, especially establishing the eFP.” “The Baltic States have never been so 
secure,” one respondent claimed, “[…] while there are differences between some member 
states, the overall perception of threats is established. It used to be very tricky, [the Baltic 
States] used to be the only ones saying that Russia needs attention.”  
Another respondent commented on NATO’s compromises and its current posture in the 
Baltics by saying, “At this stage it is enough. It could always be more, but there are other 
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aspects why what we [the Baltic States] have is what we have.” Another interlocutor 
added that from the perspective of the Baltic States, additional measures would be 
welcome, adding, “However, whether the Alliance is ready, is another question.” While 
there were exceptions on both sides, there was a tendency according to which the 
respondents from the Baltic States were more likely than those from outside of the region 
to argue for a stronger response and further action from NATO. One interviewee argued, 
“The question is do we have luxury to wait for some other opportunities? Considering the 
situation, it would be opportunistic to wait for some other developments until making 
additional adjustments.” 
One interviewee claimed that there are currently roughly three camps or philosophies in 
NATO: states that are bordered by Russia, states in the South, and states that are removed 
from both of these camps and think more globally. While this runs the risk of being 
oversimplified, it describes well the circumstances under which NATO will have to find 
the middle ground. Another respondent commented on achieving consensus among Allies 
by saying, “It will take a lot of effort to maintain the feel for the threat […],” revealing 
the work that is done in the Alliance to advocate for a certain decision.   
To be sure, this is nothing new: for example, in 2016, finding a consensus about the eFP 
battlegroups was not easy either. For instance, while Germany played an important role 
in reassuring NATO’s Eastern Allies, the country also publicly expressed its concern 
about reassurance measures that might provoke Russia and thereby escalate the conflict. 
German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier used the term ‘sabre-rattling’ to 
describe a NATO exercise in Poland only a few weeks before the Warsaw Summit, 
revealing a major discrepancy with some NATO allies – especially those bordering 
Russia – which interpreted the situation very differently (Allers 2017, 26). 
Using bilateral arrangements to fill the gaps NATO leaves  
Past experiences have shown that given the lengthy process of finding consensus between 
29 NATO member states, when a precarious situation in the Baltic States emerges, the air 
forces of the United States and other major NATO Allies are likely to arrive in the theater 
the quickest. In 2014 when Russia invaded Ukraine, USAF F-15s were the first to arrive 
in the Baltics. “The decision was made by the leaders of the U.S., and given the speed 
with which air assets can relocate, on the next day, U.S. fighters were in Estonia, sending 
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a strong message that Allies will come to the defense of the Baltic States if a crisis hits,” 
one interviewee recalled. 
There was a consensus among interviewees that even though NATO has improved its 
decision-making ability through giving SACEUR more freedom of decision, it is still 
practically inevitable that Allies either bilaterally or in coalitions of the willing will be 
able to take a decision and act faster than NATO. A few respondents said that this not too 
big of a problem, and while “there is a line that shouldn’t be crossed,” filling NATO’s 
gaps through bilateral or trilateral agreements and deployment is fine as long as the job 
gets done.  
However, a majority of respondents claimed that the goal should be to do as much through 
the framework of NATO as possible. As one respondent argued, “[…] it would be better 
if everything is done under NATO umbrella: it would add stability and predictability. We 
[the Baltic States] are doing regional stuff here [in the Baltic States], it would be good to 
see that NATO is also stepping up and putting its umbrella on top of it.” Another 
respondent claimed that having countries first react bilaterally is “not what we want to 
happen,” making the case that political agreements for crisis situations should made ahead 
of time so that everyone would be prepared when NATO “throw[s] the switch”. He then 
added, “That’s a real hard political thing, I know that.” 
While difficult, several authors suggest that achieving consensus and using NATO as the 
main format for cooperation instead of relying on bilateral agreements would strengthen 
NATO’s deterrence posture. It would demonstrate that the Alliance has resources as well 
as political will to use them, if necessary (Kainikara 2008, 4). This is the core of Morgan’s 
understanding of credibility, which he defines as “looking like you have the will and 
capabilities necessary to carry out your threats,” (Morgan 2003, 101). 
Regional arrangements: the case of Finland and Sweden  
Nonetheless, there was agreement among the interviewees that several issues will be 
worked out through bilateral or regional security arrangements rather than in the 
framework of the Alliance. In the Baltic Sea region, this is almost inevitable, as the 
geography of Sweden and Finland makes these two non-NATO countries very relevant 
in terms of applying airpower in the Baltic States.      
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Sweden and Finland have been members of NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program since 
1994, and have bilateral defense agreements with many NATO countries. While both 
countries have a strong tradition of neutrality, several interviewees argued it is challenged 
by the fact that the counties are signatories to the Lisbon Treaty, Article 42.7 of which 
states that EU member states have the obligation to aid a member state that is “the victim 
of armed aggression on its territory” (EUR Lex 2008). Furthermore, in 2016, the 
governments of Finland and Sweden adopted the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
on Host Nation Support (HNS) with NATO to provide effective support for NATO’s 
activities on their territory or in its proximity, both in peacetime and during a crisis 
(Eriksson 2016; Malmquvist 2018). As one interviewee put it, “If the host nation support 
agreement is implemented, it will surely neutralize any position of neutrality.” 
Due to the aforementioned agreements, most interviewees argued that it would not be 
possible to have a NATO-Russia conflict in which Finland and Sweden would be not pick 
a side. However, these decisions may not come immediately, and as several interviewees 
suggested, a MoU is not a treaty, but essentially a policy document that expresses intent 
rather than gives out guarantees. This means there is room for negotiation and freedom 
of action in any specific scenario. 
The interviewees overwhelmingly accepted the idea that it would be much easier for 
NATO to defend the Baltic States (from the air) if the Alliance was able to use the air 
surveillance data, air space and/or air bases of Finland and Sweden. Some respondents 
argued that defending the Baltics without involving the airspaces of Finland and Sweden 
would be “extremely hard” and that there is a “huge reliance” on cooperation with these 
two countries. 
Several respondents argued that NATO could, and if needed, will defend the Baltics 
without access to Finland and Sweden, but that it would take longer and come at a much 
greater cost. There seemed to be a general agreement that having access to the airspace 
of Sweden is more instrumental than having access to that of Finland; a few respondents 
also noted that if Sweden was not an option, NATO would be likely to use air bases in 
Norway. A few respondents incorporated Russia’s A2/AD capabilities in this question in 
a direct way, claiming, “If NATO cannot use Swedish airspace, then it needs to degrade 
Russia’s [A2/AD] capabilities in Kaliningrad.” 
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Several interviewees noted that at the military and technical level, the integration of 
Finland and Sweden with NATO is very strong, but that this cooperation is not guaranteed 
in a crisis situation, and there are limits to the cooperation that partner countries can 
undertake with members of the Alliance. One interviewee argued, “If the Swedish 
Ministry of Defense (MoD) is saying that it can do anything short of joint planning, it 
means we [NATO] cannot rely on their assets.” He continued, “Joint planning means 
giving up the sovereign right to use your assets – someone else would have command 
over those,” making the case that “as soon as it gets real,” NATO partners could not be 
included in planning or discussions about obligations. Other were more positive about the 
opportunities for cooperation, and the majority of respondents considered it important to 
mention that Finland and Sweden are free to make their independent decisions.  
Particularly after 2014, Finland and Sweden have largely shared the threat perception of 
the Baltic States and Poland with regard to revisionist Russia. At the same time, some of 
NATO’s Southern Allies, for example, have had a different perspective, creating the 
threat of closer cooperation with Sweden and Finland “alienating Allies”, a concern that 
several interviewees raised. One interviewee argued, “Some NATO allies do not want to 
do anything more with Sweden and Finland before they decide if they are in or out,” 
arguing that for them, the partnership seems to have been taken as far as it gets.  
A ramification of this is the fact that a few NATO countries have spoken out against 
increased transparency and intelligence sharing with non-allies. While mentioned by 
several interviewees, a majority of the respondents reported that they were not aware that 
any NATO ally would feel alienated because of NATO’s strong partnership with Finland 
and Sweden. Allers has written on the issue and seems to agree with those who do not 
consider this a major problem. NATO has tried to solve or pre-empt such problems, for 
instance by coming up with the 360-degree approach, designed to tackle all challenges 
both to the East and South of the Alliance. Allers also points out how “Portugal 
participated in Baltic air policing, Spain committed to lead the VJTF, and Poland also 
joined crisis management exercises in the South,” making the case that the East-South 
divide in NATO is overstated (2017, 27). 
A few interviewees mentioned that in June 2017, Sweden and Finland joined the UK-led 
Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), a high-readiness force tasked with tackling threats and 
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responding to crises around the world. These respondents argued that this might be a 
“precursor to taking another step and becoming NATO aligned”. However, the issue of 
possible membership is intricate.  It would have direct ramifications on the relationship 
between NATO and Russia, as Sokolsky argues, Moscow has threatened to respond 
militarily if the two countries decided to join (2017, 3). A great majority of interviewees 
argued that the debate in Sweden and Finland over their possible membership of NATO 
seems to be changing, but that in the short term, the two countries are likely to stay out.    
To underline this, the Swedish daily Aftonbladet performed a survey in January 2018 
asking whether Sweden should join NATO. This revealed that 43 percent of respondents 
thought Sweden should join, while 37 percent were against it, signifying the highest 
support of NATO that has been recorded in recent polls (Duxbury 2018). In Finland, the 
numbers are very different. In November 2017, a poll released by the Ministry of Defense 
of Finland showed that 22 percent of respondents supported NATO membership while 
62 percent were against it (Reuters 2017). 
Several interviewees highlighted the importance of bilateral agreements between Sweden 
and Finland with the U.S., contending that a pre-made agreement that would, for example, 
allow the USAF to use the airspace and air bases of Sweden in the case of military crisis 
would greatly ease NATO’s ability to defend the Baltic States. The idea of possibly using 
the JEF framework for air defense solutions also came up. One interviewee declared, 
“Estonia got much more interested in JEF when it heard that Sweden and Finland were 
participating,” arguing that from the geographical perspective, this cooperation would 
make a lot of sense. 
This falls in line with the recent study of the CSIS in which the authors call for Northern 
European air defense that would include all eight Nordic and Baltic countries, making the 
case that this would be the best arrangement considering the geography of the Baltic Sea 
region  (Conley, Rathke and Melino 2018). Researchers from the U.S. and elsewhere have 
called upon the U.S. government to work with the non-NATO Nordic countries and fill a 
leadership role in finding and improving the air defense of the Baltic States and ensure 
regional cooperation (Coffey and Kochis 2017, 3; Breedlove 2018). 
In summary, the interviewees were satisfied with the steps undertaken by NATO after 
2014 in response to Russia’s revisionist policies. Building and maintaining a consensus 
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among NATO members will remain crucial in the future, and there are no reasons to think 
that this process is about to get much easier. There is unease among experts regarding the 
use of bilateral and multilateral agreements to plug the gaps that emerge as a result of 
NATO’s lengthy decision-making processes, and the majority of them argues that the 
goal should be giving the Alliance the tools and processes to stay relevant in situations 
that require rapid response.  
The respondents were in agreement that Sweden and Finland have a very high level of 
interoperability with NATO, and that purely from the military perspective, it would be 
much easier to “do good things” if the political decision to join the Alliance was made. 
However, such decision is not likely to come in the near future, and therefore cooperation 
bilaterally and in non-NATO multilateral arrangements will continue. Building on the 
strong bilateral relations of Finland and Sweden with the U.S., the case was made that 
Washington should encourage and lead cooperation in the Baltic Sea region.      
 
4.3 Choices in Further Developing NATO Airpower in the Baltic Sea Region 
While understanding the broader context for issues and different frameworks for 
cooperation is important, the interviewees were also asked about more concrete ideas as 
to how the airpower component of NATO in the Baltic States could be strengthened. In 
many ways, the discussions were related to the issues of Allied unity, but there were also 
several new findings that focusing on more concrete ideas helped uncover.  
This section is divided into four parts. The first one focuses on improving the ground-
based air defense capabilities of the Baltic States, the second considers the possible 
transition from the BAP to Baltic air defense. The third subsection discusses the option 
of adding an air dimension to the eFP battlegroups, and the final part talks about 
exercising rapid reinforcement in a joint environment.  
Improving the ground-based air defense capabilities of the Baltic States  
The lack of adequate air defense in the Baltic States is a capability gap most often 
mentioned, and most passionately described by the interviewees. At the moment, the three 
Baltic States operate only short-range missile defense systems. While Lithuania is 
currently procuring medium-range systems, and Latvia has announced plans to do so, the 
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situation is nonetheless concerning. As one interviewee put it, “Any time you have boots 
on the ground, several battalions [like now in the Baltic States], the lack of air cover – it 
just doesn’t paint a very good picture.”  
This problem would be even more serious in a crisis scenario in which there is a need for 
mobilization and bringing in reinforcement. The lack of air defense in this scenario is 
“potentially devastating” as one interviewee put, arguing that the troops and equipment 
of the Baltic States “might not even make it to the battleground” before being neutralized, 
unless there are plans on how to conduct air defense for high-value targets such as 
mobilization routes and depots, airports and seaports. One respondent claimed, “If there 
was a surprise need to mobilize, air defense would have to be beefed up. There is no way 
NATO would let the Baltic States be overrun by an air campaign.” 
While the interviewees were in agreement about the need for an integrated ground-based 
air defense capability in the Baltics, there were diverging opinions as to how this could 
be accomplished. Several respondents noted that ground-based air defense has been 
recognized as “a capability gap that has a high priority” in the Baltic States for several 
years, but despite the efforts, limited resources and other priorities have not made it 
possible to acquire such new capabilities.  
Several interviewees argued that it is important to retain and exercise the current very 
short-range and short-range air defense capabilities together with passive defense 
strategies such as decentralizing and using decoys. The Baltic States need to retain and 
develop their short-range missile defense capability, as this, alongside with medium- and 
long-range capability would remain an integral part of a layered air defense architecture. 
This would ensure that they are able to do as much as possible with their indigenous 
forces – an ability that is particularly critical in the beginning of a conflict. While it can 
be the case, as one interviewee argued, that the Mistral systems, for example, are fully 
operable and “a solid investment,” there is now an apparent need for additional 
capabilities that would have a range far over the 6km scope allowed by short-range 
systems. Importantly, these have to be integrated into a coherent air defense architecture.  
Interviewees had quite different views of the kind of ground-based system that the Baltic 
States needed, and they also differed in providing solutions as to how to go about 
acquiring these capabilities. Several interviewees argued that there is an urgent need for 
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an integrated medium-range system in the Baltic States. The general suggestion was to 
procure something together to “benefit from the economies of scale, ensure 
interoperability and lower handling costs.”  
Several interviewees noted that there have been aspirations for possible common 
procurement projects, but these have not panned out due to different preferences with 
regard to specific conditions and timelines. Consequently, Lithuania ended up procuring 
a medium-range system only for itself, Latvia has taken the decision to do the same. 
Commenting on this, several interviewees noted that the Baltic States “could show more 
political willingness to work together” even on complex issues such as (big) procurement 
projects, but noted that this is difficult for almost all countries. 
One respondent contended, “Lithuania is currently ahead of Estonia and Latvia [in terms 
of mid-range air defense], but this is not a competition. If they [Lithuanian Armed Forces] 
are willing to share the information about how the procurement went, based on these 
lessons we could put together an even better procurement project in the future.” 
Several interviewees saw this as a stepping stone to something bigger, arguing, 
“Commitment to their [the Baltic States] own organic air defense would be great. You 
can’t get that right away, but the political announcement to invest in some form of 
integrated air defense or ground-based air defense would be a great message to send.” 
Another interviewee stated that the Baltic States should invest in their air defense and 
thereby help NATO with “generating the foundations for a robust enforcement plan,” 
arguing that, “The Baltic States should deliver together with neighbors, then go back to 
the alliance and ask them to provide something.” This idea has been remarked upon in 
several reports (Harper, Lawrence and Sakkov 2018; Breedlove 2018).  
Possibility of long-range air defense in the Baltics  
When it comes to long-range missile systems, a majority of the respondents argued that 
acquiring these is financially insurmountable for the Baltic States and would require help 
from the allies. “Long-range missile defense is crazy, out of reach for the Baltic States,” 
one interviewee stated. Another respondent claimed, “There is no money for Patriot, even 
when someone gives it as a gift,” referring to the substantial life-cycle costs of these 
systems. A few respondents were more optimistic, arguing that the Baltic States 
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“absolutely would have money for Patriot,” adding that what is missing is “an 
understanding of the air domain and politicians who support it.”  
While the price of the Patriot system depends on various factors and the specific 
configurations of the system, for instance, in late 2017, Poland got an offer to procure 
four systems for $10.5 billion (Judson 2017). Converted into euros, this equals €8.9 
billion, and is a an extremely large number considering that the combined annual defense 
expenditure of the three Baltic States in 2017 was a little less than €1.7 billion (NATO 
2018). Needless to say, this is the price tag for just purchasing the four systems, and (very 
significant) operating costs would be added to that in the future. 
There seemed to be a general agreement that the Baltic States could be covered by a long-
range missile system if it was either deployed in the Baltic States by Allies on a 
(permanent) rotational basis or deployed somewhere outside of the Baltic States. As one 
respondent argued, “Procedures are most important: there is no need to bring the [air 
defense] assets here, ships in the North Sea could well keep the Baltic States under cover,” 
referring to a possible use of the Aegis system to the benefit of the Baltic States.  
Several interviewees argued that NATO has already made similar arrangements with the 
Patriot system, for instance in Turkey and Romania. The deployment could also take place 
bilaterally, a few respondents hinted at the positive signals from the Trump administration 
about possibly deploying a Patriot battery in the Baltics. Coffey and Kochis (2017) also 
expressed some optimism regarding such possibility. There was an agreement that any 
such decision would “contribute to the deterrent posture of NATO and might change 
Russia’s thinking,” but most of the interviewees did not consider it very likely to occur, 
at least in the short- or medium-term.   
Several respondents referred to the groundwork that needs to be laid not just before a 
long-range missile system can be deployed, but also to achieve full functionality. The 
Baltic States need to produce a Recognized Air Picture (RAP), and in addition to that, as 
one respondent put it, “provide the middle piece to connect the picture with the effector.” 
A few respondents remarked that the Baltic States already share their RAP through 
NATINAMDS, but more work needs to be done to improve the current network of radar 
systems and sensors. This is largely in agreement with the assessments of Breedlove 
(2018) as well as Harper, Lawrence and Sakkov (2018).   
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Notably, as one interviewee explained, in a crisis situation, “up to a certain point, air force 
command and control (C2) [of the relevant Baltic State] leads the operation, only then 
NATINAMDS will take over,” stressing the importance of prior exercising to ensure the 
interoperability of C2. Vulnerabilities in networks that ensure C2 has been identified as a 
key shortfall in the Baltics (Harper, Lawrence and Sakkov 2018, v), and this is critical as 
malfunctioning C2 can put the whole mission at risk. To further accentuate this issue, 
Conley, Rathke and Melino proposed creating a third NATO Joint Command that would 
lower the risk of related problems during a crisis in the North Atlantic or the Baltic Sea 
(2017, 30).  
 
Transitioning from Baltic Air Policing Mission to Baltic air defense  
While ground-based air defense capabilities are important and generally viewed by the 
interviewees as the first priority, there was also talk about the role of aircraft in providing 
air defense in the Baltics.  As one respondent put it, “[…] air defense is a combination of 
fixed wing aircraft and ground based air defenses, it is not one or the other, neither can 
do it alone,” arguing that setting up layered air defense should be the ultimate goal of the 
Baltic States.  
A majority of the interviewees agreed that the Baltic Air Policing Mission (BAP), a 
strictly peacetime mission with no air defense capacity, has been a success. As one 
respondent claimed, “Currently, nations are queuing up to send their detachment to do 
Baltic Air Policing. Germany recently said it would like the rotation to be eight months 
instead of four,” describing a situation in which not enough space for all Allies who would 
like to contribute to the mission.  
In terms of absolute numbers of air assets, BAP is rather limited. As one respondent put 
it, “Russia probably looks at these four jets in Ämari2 as humor,” but it nonetheless forces 
Russia to change its calculus. As several interviewees noted, the country has repeatedly 
experienced what it is like to be escorted by NATO fighters when Russia brings its air 
                                                 
2 One rotation of BAP normally has eight jets operating from the Siaulai airbase in Lihtuania, and four from 
Ämari airbase in Estonia.  
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assets very close to or into to the airspace of the Baltic States, often without turning the 
transponders on and communicating with the flight controllers.  
However, another thing that Russia is well aware of, is that the rules of engagement (RoE) 
for assets deployed for BAP are very restrictive. As many interviewees contended, the 
RoE allows the pilots to patrol the airspace, “signify that an aircraft is not allowed to enter 
the airspace,” and protect themselves, but not much more. Several interviewees argued, 
that the current RoE of BAP puts pilots in a very difficult position, and this should be 
changed. At the same time, a significant number of respondents claimed that there is no 
need to change the BAP as it stands. One interviewee argued that, “First and foremost, it 
would be important to get a confirmation that BAP will stay,” claiming that the Alliance 
should make this mission permanent.  
Already in 2016, several experts argued that the BAP should be transitioned to air 
defense, or at the minimum, that there needs to be a clear and exercised plan for this 
transition (Gorenc 2016, 90; Praks and Stoicescu 2016, 29). Besides having diverging 
opinions about whether or not the transition should happen, the interviewees, remarkably, 
also had very different understandings as to what this transition would mean. Some were 
certain that this transition cannot be done in a piecemeal fashion and presupposes 
“different capabilities, different aircraft, improved C2, and ground-based air defense.” An 
interviewee argued that all of these systems need to be properly connected and be 
supplemented by detailed plans, making the case that stockpiles and missiles would also 
have to be pre-positioned to the region.  
However, some other respondents argued that it is not clear to them that the transition 
would necessarily mean a substantial quantitative and qualitative change in terms of air 
assets deployed to the region. As one interviewee put it, “Many people think that 
transitioning from BAP to air defense would right away mean more capabilities, but is it 
really necessary? I think it would be most important to send a message that [NATO is 
now] more serious about this.” There were several people supporting this approach and 
arguing that the transition is mainly about procedures and RoE, and the Alliance could 
strengthen its deterrent posture even just by changing the name of the mission. 
Generally, the literature suggests that while procedures and RoE are important, the 
transition would have to involve various improved capabilities, particularly in the field of 
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GBAD (Gorenc 2016, 91; Breedlove 2018, Coffey and Kochis 2017). Some argue that 
the transition to air defense is not sensible given the inadequacy of C4ISR capabilities of 
the Baltic States, and claim these capability gaps must be overcome before the transition 
can happen (Harper, Lawrence, Sakkov 2018, 25).  
Another interviewee claimed that transition to air defense posture would be beneficial in 
the light of Russia’s respect of strength over weakness; arguing, “Russia would surely not 
like when the transition [to air defense] is made, but they would have respect it,” he stated, 
adding that a threat that Russia might lose its air assets over provocations near the Baltic 
airspace could make the Kremlin reconsider their actions.  
The interviewees claimed that currently, the main problem is that there are no pre-existing 
agreements for such transition, and NATO’s decision-making procedure would take days 
and weeks, but not minutes or hours as it would be needed. One interviewee argued, 
“NATO needs to get out of its comfort zone and put together a toolbox,” claiming that it 
would be easiest if “NATO bought equipment worth of one squadron, [and own it] just 
as it owns AWACS,” so that the host-nations would be better able to accommodate the 
flying assets and pilots that would rotate.  
Considering the fundamental difference between air policing and air defense, a few 
respondents claimed that it could be possible to have two separate missions: for instance, 
retaining BAP as it is an adding an air defense mission. An interviewee stated, “it could 
be possible to consider creating something like a quick reaction fighter squadron in which 
appropriate RoE would be in place, that would make it easy to engage quickly, if needed,” 
arguing that these assets will not be based in the Baltics, but in a permissive environment 
from where they could get to the Baltic theater quickly.  
Whether the focus would be on changing procedures and RoE or augmenting the current 
assets, as one respondent argued, “First and foremost, this transition takes a political 
decision from the Allies.” Commenting on the popularity of BAP, one respondent argued, 
“The nations are happy to do air policing because this is more of a peacetime, soft power 
oriented air mission, while air defense is largely a conflict-oriented mission,” hinting that 
Allies that take part in the mission might not be very interested in making the transition.  
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Adding an air dimension to the eFP battlegroups  
Several interviewees argued that improving Baltic air defense capabilities is all the more 
important given that the eFP multinational battlegroups are based in these countries. One 
of the possible components of future Baltic air defense arrangement could be adding an 
air dimension to the battlegroups, a recommendation made by various experts in the 
literature (Breedlove 2018; Coffey and Kochis 2017; Harper, Lawerence and Sakkov 
2018, 28). As Breedlove put it, “These national [air] capabilities could be leveraged for 
exercises in the region, and could initially build familiarity and interoperability with the 
operational environment,” (2018, 6). 
Several respondents saw this as a valuable idea, arguing that adding air (and most likely 
also maritime) capabilities, is “the next natural step” with regard to eFP battlegroups. One 
interviewee claimed, “NATO agreed in Warsaw that the eFP would be a ‘joint enabled 
force’, but we are currently not in a position to conduct joint enablement exercises for the 
eFP battlegroups,” making the case that this is an unfulfilled promise on the part of the 
Alliance. Several interviewees noted that the UK, for example, has already taken the 
decision to deploy its Lynx Wildcat helicopters to Estonia in support of its battlegroup.  
A number of interviewees interpreted the situation differently, claiming that air-ground 
exercises are important, but that “it is not necessarily a requirement for some air platforms 
to be present [at eFP battle groups] all the time.” However, the respondents still 
emphasized that it is important “to communicate – for the sake of deterrence – that air 
support is there when needed, and it is relevant speed-wise.” One respondent argued, “It 
is good that the eFP has variable geometry, it is constantly changing,” making the case 
that “an occasional surge” is more useful than permanent stationing.  
While exercising is important, the air assets do not necessarily have to be connected to 
the eFP to train with them. As one interviewee explained, “even when fighters are 
deployed to the Baltic States bilaterally or for the BAP, they almost always train across 
the battlegroup,” arguing that the situation with joint trainings is quite good. One 
respondent argued that NATO is “[…] highly unlikely to bolster the eFP in one particular 
area unless there is something to show that the Baltic States really need it.” 
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A few interviewees had a different reason to be skeptical about the possibility of adding 
an air dimension to the eFP. One respondent argued that the eFP as a tripwire force has 
natural limitations, and there is not much to gain when it is augmented. He continued, 
“What we [NATO] have established is a quite well balanced deterrence posture which is 
not triggering security dilemma,” adding that the “air piece is always expensive and hard 
to build,” and as the eFP units are not designed to fight, their current capabilities are 
sufficient. 
Exercising rapid reinforcement in a joint environment 
Several interviewees noted that military mobility in Europe and related to that, NATO’s 
ability for (rapid) reinforcement, are likely to be among the central topics expected to be 
discussed during NATO’s Brussels Summit in July 2018. This is crucial from the 
standpoint of airpower and for the purposes of this thesis. As one respondent put it, 
“Moving lots of equipment and people along a road or rail is something that we [NATO] 
haven’t done in a long while. We were good at this in the 1970s, we are not good at it 
now,” once again alluding to the fact that in recent decades, NATO has mostly focused 
on peace enforcement operations in theaters (far) away from Europe.    
A majority of respondents expressed their concern about the lack of medium- or large-
scale NATO joint exercises joint military exercises in the Baltic region, claiming that is 
not enough if capabilities “are just somewhere,” as one respondent put it. Another 
interviewee explained the importance of exercises, arguing, “What is not presently trained 
and implemented will become harder to resolve quickly in a crisis situation. [If the 
contingency plans are not exercised] the crisis may well be over before the reactive 
measures are viable.”  
Several interviewees claimed that exercises are very much a part of the deterrence 
posture, adding that exercising in a joint setting with the ability to test the interoperability 
of ground, air and maritime (cyber and EW) components, is crucial. One respondent 
argued, “For all bits and pieces to work together as one single system – you need to 
practice, this is the way forward,” claiming that ground-based air defense assets should 
be brought to the Baltic States to ensure a very high level of interoperability between the 
different force components. 
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The literature reaffirms the importance of exercises, for Gorenc, these have to be 
“realistic, full-spectrum, and deterrence-focused,” (2016, 101). It was decided at the 
Warsaw Summit that the eFP battlegroups would “underpinned by a viable reinforcement 
strategy,” (NATO 2016a) but it remains unclear whether the Alliance will take the lead 
to exercise these reinforcement plans and enhance the credibility of NATO.  
If that does not happen soon enough, as several interviewees suggested, one or more 
capable allies will take the lead and invite others to join. If that were to happen, one 
respondent claimed that “At some point, NATO would get involved more substantially 
and potentially take the lead of the exercise,” demonstrating different dynamics that 
bilateral and multilateral actions may create.  Another respondent argued that any such 
exercises in the Baltic States should begin with “[...] making sure that all infrastructure 
in Poland would support bringing more assets,” arguing that this should be in place before 
starting to think about how to move it to the North.  
Conducting medium- and large-scale reinforcement in a crisis and even exercising for it 
is not easy. As one respondent put it, “That’s where the hard work is – in providing that 
infrastructure, policy, and process. It is doable, but there is a lot of work that needs to go 
on to provide these policies and processes.” As another respondent claimed, the situation 
can be made even more difficult by the fact that, “Russia considers the three Baltic States 
as one unit, if it does something in one place, it is likely that it does it in another as well,” 
arguing that the Baltic States need to be able to take responsibility for themselves in the 
beginning of the conflict.   
Two interviewees remarked on a different aspect of the rapid reinforcement problem, 
arguing, “I understand that this is an unpalatable idea, but if NATO’s deterrence fails, it 
can use its airpower somewhere else, it would not necessarily come to reinforce the Baltic 
States. Russia has weak points, NATO might hurt Russia where it hurts the most.” 
Another respondent thought along the same lines, wondering, “[…] maybe we [NATO] 
do not need to have that good of an infrastructure in the Baltic States, as the first priority 
[for NATO] would be to deal with problems somewhere else.” Such ideas have not been 
considered in literature on the topic, and it is therefore difficult to assess their validity, 
but they are nonetheless a valuable addition to the discussion.  
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In conclusion, the range of options for strengthening NATO’s airpower in the Baltic 
States is quite broad. The themes of acting through bilateral and multilateral agreements 
and reaching consensus among the Allies raised on several occasions, pointing to their 
centrality in the debate. Developing ground-based air defense capabilities of the Baltic 
States was considered a priority by a majority of respondents. While there were those 
who suggested that the Alliance should work out an arrangement for the Baltics, several 
respondents made a convincing case for encouraging the Baltic States to come together 
and make a commitment to collectively develop integrated medium-range air defense 
capabilities.  
With regard to the transition from BAP to Baltic air defense, it was expected that there 
would be various opinions about whether and when the transition should take place. 
However, it also appeared that there were several different interpretations as to what this 
transition would mean. It the understandings ranged from changing essentially only the 
name of the mission to a complete upgrade of the host of exciting capabilities. The way 
the respondents construed the eFP battlegroups also differed. Some saw adding further 
enablers to the tripwire-sized force as an important step, while others argued that 
augmenting the eFP is not compatible with its purpose. 
Finally, conducting medium- to large-scale military exercises with the goal of rapid 
reinforcement in a joint environment were widely endorsed as being very important to 
strengthen NATO’s defense and deterrence on its Eastern flank. This goes to show the 
extent to which the military domains are inseparable, particularly considering the multi-
dimensional A2/AD challenge. Fundamentally, the reasoning behind preferring or 
rejecting some of these choices is intricately linked with the perception of what will deter 
Russia.  
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Conclusion  
 
Since 2014, NATO has made considerable progress in strengthening its deterrence and 
defense posture in the Baltic States. Setting up the eFP battlegroups was a major 
achievement. However, it is a tripwire force with the aim of ensuring that the whole 
alliance will be involved once the tripwire is triggered. NATO’s current posture in the 
Baltic States is deterrence by punishment, and the Alliance relies heavily on rapid 
reinforcement in the times of crisis. Deterrence by punishment relies on reprisal or 
retaliation against an opponent, and this distinguishes it from deterrence by denial that 
makes it physically difficult for an adversary to achieve their objective.   
 
Airpower is as a potent tool to support the effort of rapid reinforcement, but the geography 
of the Baltic Sea region severely limits NATO’s operational depth which is necessary for 
air operations. NATO’s ability for (rapid) reinforcement on its Eastern flank by air, sea, 
and land, is further challenged by Russia’s A2/AD capability. By implementing its 
A2/AD capability, Russia actively challenges and mitigates NATO’s posture of 
deterrence by punishment. NATO has not exercised (rapid) reinforcement on its Eastern 
flank, and this poses a credibility problem. It might give Russia hope for achieving a 
quick victory and a fait accompli situation before NATO could react and its follow-on 
forces could arrive.  
 
In order to understand this complex picture of deterrence and the role of airpower in it, 
this thesis relies on a synthesis of works from authors such as John Warden, Colin Gray, 
John Mearsheimer, Patrick Morgan and Sanu Kainikara. Importantly, airpower doctrines 
are also part of the theoretical framework as they are a critical part of theoretical 
discussions, but also have direct implications for applying airpower in practice. This 
research considers the works of airpower theorists and deterrence experts in a modern 
context, with a particular attention on the relationship of A2/AD with deterrence.  
 
In addition to the geographical advantage that Russia possesses over NATO in the Baltic 
Sea region, the balance of conventional forces is strongly skewed in favor of Russia. In 
Kaliningrad and along the Russia-NATO border, Russia has set up advanced and 
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formidable layered air defense systems which reach far into the territories of the Baltic 
States and therefore have a direct impact on the security of the Alliance. Air assets and 
ground-based air defense systems have an important role in any reinforcement scenario, 
as critical infrastructure such as mobilization depots and routes, airports and seaports need 
to be protected from attacks from the air.  
 
Currently, the Baltic States possess short-range missile air defense capability. While a 
very important part of NATO’s peacetime activities, the Baltic Air Policing Mission has 
limited rules of engagement (RoE) and does not prepare NATO for protecting some of its 
most vulnerable Allies on the Eastern flank of the Alliance. The lack of adequate air 
defense has been established as a shortfall that needs urgent attention starting with 
discussions in 2014, but NATO has as of yet not been able to come up with a solution.  
 
One of the goals of this thesis is to explain the complexity of the issue and shed light on 
various reasons for why it has been difficult for the Alliance to address these concerns. 
Evidently, understanding these issues will help defense planners get closer to solutions in 
the future. Recently, various research institutions, think tanks and experts have published 
reports (see, for example, Gorenc 2016; Coffey and Kochis 2017; Conley, Rathke and 
Melino 2018; Breedlove 2018; Harper, Lawrence and Sakkov 2018) and outlined a host 
of policy recommendations and ideas as to how to tackle and solve the problem of air 
defense in the Baltics, and thereby strengthen NATO’s deterrent and defense posture. 
What is almost entirely missing in the literature, is a comprehensive discussion that helps 
explain the complexity of the issue and sheds light on reasons there is not yet a solution.  
 
In order to fill this gap and provide up-to-date information on the issue, twenty expert 
interviews with military personnel, defense planners, experts and politicians from the 
Baltic States, the U.K., the U.S., Sweden and Finland were conducted. This thesis 
includes an analysis of the interview responses and literature available on the topic. Based 
on this analysis, three main conclusions were drawn:  
 
 The concept of A2/AD and its impact for deterrence is not well understood and 
this makes it difficult to tackle this issue;   
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 There is no common understanding among the experts what a transition from 
Baltic Air Policing to air defense would mean;  
 The importance of the Baltic States collectively taking the initiative in the air 
defense realm is currently understated.  
 
Firstly, understanding and explaining the nature of the contested environment and 
Russia’s A2/AD capability was at the center of this thesis. Currently, there is a lack of a 
common understanding about what the A2/AD challenge means, and its multi-domain 
character is underappreciated. The Alliance could start by including the concept of 
A2/AD in its doctrines and strategic documents, and present comprehensive and coherent 
plans as to how it will prevail in contested environments, for instance the one created by 
Russia in the Baltic Sea region.  
 
Furthermore, it is necessary to either redefine (for instance, William Perkins has 
suggested using the term ‘Advanced Layered Defense Systems’) or clarify the meaning 
of the term A2/AD to make this strategically important concept more universally 
understandable by NATO Allies. The situation is often even worse in languages other 
than English, which also use the very technical term of A2/AD.  
 
Better explaining and defining the term A2/AD would help ensure clarity among military 
personnel, and ensure that defense planners, politicians and the public more broadly 
would become more familiar with the strategically important concept. In addition to that, 
it would help ensure that Russia cannot use this in its strategic communication efforts to 
inflate its capabilities by claiming that its A2/AD zones are impenetrable. This is part of 
Russia’s manipulation tactics aimed at reducing the confidence of the people in the Baltic 
States in NATO.  
  
Secondly, it appeared that there is no common understanding about what the transition 
from BAP to Baltic air defense would mean. Importantly, the divergence was not (just) 
about whether or not the transition is necessary: some respondents argued that the 
transition would involve a substantive improvement of assets and equipment, while others 
74 
 
saw this as mainly a procedural change that would not necessarily involve any new 
capabilities.  
 
This is striking given that the interviewees were experts in the field of Baltic Sea security 
and/or airpower, and the discussions about this transition have been ongoing for the past 
several years. At the same time, it helps explain the lack of progress that has been made. 
Defining and agreeing on the main features of this transition would create a much better 
platform for holding discussions among the Allies about whether or not it is necessary.  
 
Finally, a significant number of interviewees made the point that despite the small sizes, 
and small defense budgets of the Baltic States, there is a lot that the three countries can 
do to lay the groundwork for a much-needed layered air defense architecture. The bottom 
layer, short-range missile defense is already at place, but to improve these capabilities, 
the Baltic States should show commitment to working together even on complex issues.  
 
Collectively undertaking big procurement projects has proved difficult for most countries, 
but the Baltic States share the same goal and could greatly benefit from prioritizing 
cooperation. The decision to collectively proceed with the procurement of medium-range 
missile defense systems (which is currently underway in Lithuania and about to begin in 
Latvia) would send a strong message to the Alliance, and it would open the possibility 
that the Allies would later augment the system put in place.  
 
A common thread that ran through the themes of this research is the importance of allied 
unity. This remains critical for NATO, and finding a consensus on important matters is 
all the more important given that the adversary is testing the cohesion of NATO with its 
manipulation tactics and by setting up increasingly potent A2/AD capabilities.  
 
Gaining a better understanding of the contested environment presented by Russia, and 
forging a common perception of the range of measures that NATO has available will help 
the Alliance move closer to solutions that help strengthen its deterrence and defense 
posture in the Baltic States. Viable and exercised plans for rapid reinforcement, and 
commitment to medium-range integrated air defense in the Baltics could be a good first 
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step in moving from the deterrence by punishment posture towards deterrence by denial. 
This, as Mitchell (2015) put it, would “help to shift the psychological burden of 21st-
century conflict back where it belongs: on the shoulders of states that wish to rearrange 
the international order.”  
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Appendixes  
Appendix 1: List of Interviews  
Note: all interviewees were asked to share their personal opinion on the issues. Their 
current and/or previous affiliations are added to this list to give an overview of their 
background and experience.  
All interviews were conducted in March and April 2018.  
 
 Name  Position/Affiliation  Date  Location  
1.  Sven Sakkov  Director, International Centre for Defense 
and Security (ICDS)  
13.03 Tallinn  
2.  Air Marshal Sir 
Christopher 
Harper 
Former Director General of the NATO 
International Military Staff (2013-2016), 
former UK Military Representative to 
NATO and the EU (2011-2013) 
19.03 Phone 
interview  
3.  Undisclosed  Undisclosed  22.03  Written 
responses  
4.  Lt. Col. Vahur 
Karus  
Estonian Ministry of Defense/Estonian 
Defense Forces  
22.03 Tallinn 
5.  Henrik Praks  Non-resident fellow, ICDS  22.03  Tallinn 
 
6.  Dr. Mike 
Winnerstig  
Deputy Director of Research, Swedish 
Defense Research Agency (FOI); non-
resident fellow, ICDS  
23.03  Phone 
interview 
7.  Gen. (ret.) Philip 
Breedlove 
 
Former NATO’s Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe (2013-2016), former 
U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Africa 
Commander (2012-2013), Vice Chief of 
Staff of the U.S. Air Force (2011-2012). 
26.03 Phone 
interview 
8.  Sqn. Ldr. Mark 
Sapsford RAF 
United Kingdom Defense Attaché to 
Latvia, British Embassy in Riga 
27.03  Phone 
interview 
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9.  Ojārs Ēriks 
Kalniņš 
Head of the Latvian Delegation to NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly, member of the 
Seimas  
27.03  Phone 
interview 
10.  Bartas Trakymas  Lithuanian Ministry of Defense   29.03  Phone 
interview 
11.  Lt. Col. Antti 
Hauvala  
Finnish Defense attaché to Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania; Finnish Embassy in Tallinn  
29.03  Tallinn 
12.  Undisclosed  Undisclosed  2.04  Tallinn 
 
13.  Lt. Col. Harles 
Kosk  
Air Defense Inspector, Estonian Defense 
Forces  
2.04  Tallinn 
14.  Col. Riivo Valge  Acting Commander, Estonian Air Force; 
Chief of Staff, Estonian Air Force.  
2.04 Tallinn  
15.  Marko 
Mihkelson  
Head of the Estonian delegation to NATO 
PA, Member of the Riigikogu  
3.04  Tallinn  
16.  Commander 
Gary Brooks 
United Kingdom defense attaché in 
Estonia, British Embassy in Tallinn  
4.04  Tallinn  
17.  Lt. Col. (ret.) 
Ugis Romanovs  
Instructor, Joint Air Operations, Baltic 
Defense College in Tartu, Estonia; 
research fellow at Latvian Institute of 
International Affairs  
5.04 Tartu  
18.  Lt. Col. Andres 
Helm-Rosin  
Instructor, Join Air Operations, Baltic 
Defense College in Tartu, Estonia 
5.04  Tartu  
19.  Col. Dainius 
Guzas  
Commander, Lithuanian Air Force  6.04  Tartu  
20.  Maj. Henrik 
Lahti 
Incoming Commanding Officer of the 
Gripen Operational Test and Evaluation 
squadron, Swedish Air Force 
9.04  Written 
responses   
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Appendix 2: Questions for the Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
(Category: General)  
Project Name: Strengthening the Deterrence and Defense Posture of the Baltic States: 
Allied Air Power and its Value in Alleviating NATO’s Reinforcement Problem 
Purpose of the research:  The purpose of this research is to examine possibilities for 
and challenges to the application of NATO’s air power in the Baltic Sea region. More 
specifically, the research seeks to find out to what extent and in what ways can NATO’s 
Joint Air Power alleviate some of the rapid reinforcement problems that the Alliance is 
facing in its Eastern flank.  
Semi-structured interview: The interview will take place in person, via phone or 
through Skype, and is expected to take approximately 45 minutes. Upon your approval, 
the interview will be recorded only for the use of the researcher.  
Confidentiality: This research relies only on unclassified information. All data 
collected will be secured and kept confidential. No reference will be made that could 
possibly link any individuals to specific statements made in the study. Upon your 
approval, your name will appear in the List of Interviewees in the end of the study. 
 
Preliminary list of questions for a semi-structured interview 
Air power in the Baltic Sea region and threats from Russia  
1) In the Baltic Sea region and beyond, what is the role and capability of air power 
in deterring and defending against (a) conventional and (b) hybrid threats?  
2) What is your assessment of Russia’s air power assets, including their A2/AD 
capability? How might the country use them in a potential provocation (in 
worst-case scenario, military intervention) against the Baltic States?  
3) Considering NATO assets that (a) are already in the region and (b) could be 
brought to the region, does NATO have what it takes to achieve air superiority 
or at least favorable air situation (FAS) in the Baltic Sea region?  
Defense planning in peacetime 
4) When it comes to strengthening NATO’s deterrent, do you think that adding an 
air dimension to the currently land-based Enhanced Forward Presence in the 
Baltic States would be (a) beneficial and (b) politically viable? 
5) What do you think it would take for NATO to agree to transform the Baltic Air 
Policing Mission into Baltic Air Defense? When, if ever, would be the right time 
for it?  
6) As it relates to air power, what are the most important capabilities (including 
host-nation support) that the Baltic States ought to improve on or develop? 
89 
 
7) The CSIS recently published a report Enhanced Deterrence in the North, in 
which they make the case that Northern Europe (five Scandinavian countries and 
the Baltic States) should be seen as one theater of operations, and call for 
establishing Northern Air Defense. What is your take on this; do you consider 
the idea of Northern European Air Defense (a) sensible and (b) realistic? 
 
Defense planning for a military crisis  
8) In an event of a military crisis, might there be any circumstances under which air 
power assets that are in the region for the strictly peacetime Baltic Air Policing 
Mission could be used?  
9) Due to geographical factors and infrastructure deficiencies, NATO’s ability for 
rapid reinforcement of its Eastern flank is limited. In what ways could air power 
be used to help win precious time (and space) to bring in reinforcement? 
10) How big of a problem is the lack of air defense during mobilization of the 
wartime defense structure of the three Baltic States? 
11) In an event of a military crisis in the Baltic States, how much would NATO’s 
ability to apply air power depend on whether or not the Alliance is allowed to 
use Swedish and Finnish air surveillance data, air space and/or air bases? 
 
Any additional issues and comments 
 
 
(Category: Swedish/Finnish experts) 
Preliminary list of questions for a semi-structured interview on  
Swedish/Finnish perspective on the topic 
Air power in the Baltic Sea region and threats from Russia  
1) In the Baltic Sea region and beyond, what is the role and capability of air power 
in deterring and defending against (a) conventional and (b) hybrid threats?  
2) How do you assess Russia’s air power capabilities (including A2/AD)? 
3) How might Russia use its air assets in a potential provocation (in worst-case 
scenario, military intervention) against any of the Baltic Sea states? 
4) In what ways can NATO and its partners Finland and Sweden use air power to 
try to minimize the risk of conflict with Russia?   
 
NATO, Finland and Sweden: defense planning in peacetime 
5) How do you see potential of PESCO, NORDEFCO, NB8, 8+1 and other security 
arrangements in facilitating air power cooperation between Finland and Sweden 
on the one side, and NATO allies on the other?  
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6) General Philip Breedlove (USAF, ret.) argued in a recent article published by 
the Atlantic Council that now is the time to transition from Baltic Air Policing 
Mission to Baltic Air Defense Mission. From your perspective, would that 
strengthen the security of the Baltic Sea region or risk causing further 
instability?  
7) The CSIS recently published a report Enhanced Deterrence in the North, in 
which they make the case that Northern Europe (five Scandinavian countries and 
the Baltic States) should be seen as one theater of operations, and call for 
establishing Northern Air Defense. What is your take on this; do you consider 
the idea of Northern European Air Defense (a) sensible and (b) realistic? 
 
NATO, Finland and Sweden: defense planning for a military crisis 
8) Do you think that it is possible to have a NATO-Russia conflict in which 
Finland and Sweden would be neutral and not play any role? 
9) In the event of a military crisis in the Baltic States, NATO’s ability to apply air 
power may depend on whether or not the Alliance will have an agreement to use 
Swedish and Finnish air surveillance data, air space and/or air bases.  
i) During the time of crisis, how contentious would you expect making these 
agreements to be?  
ii) Is there a possibility for making these (political) agreements for a military 
crisis scenario before a crisis actually appears?  
 
Any additional issues and comments  
 
 
(Category: Politicians)  
Preliminary list of questions for a semi-structured interview on the  
perspective of politicians on the topic  
Air power in the Baltic Sea region and threats from Russia  
1) How do you see the role and importance of NATO air power in the providing 
deterrence and defense for the Baltic States?  
2) What is your assessment of Russia’s air power assets, including their A2/AD 
capability? How might the country use them in a potential provocation (in 
worst-case scenario, military intervention) against the Baltic States?  
 
Defense planning in peacetime 
3) When it comes to strengthening NATO’s deterrent, do you think that adding an 
air dimension to the currently land-based Enhanced Forward Presence in the 
Baltic States would be (a) beneficial and (b) politically viable? 
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4) What do you think it would take for NATO to agree to transform the Baltic Air 
Policing Mission into Baltic Air Defense? When, if ever, would be the right time 
for it?  
5) As it relates to air power, what are the most important capabilities (including 
host-nation support) that the Baltic States ought to improve on or develop? 
6) The CSIS recently published a report Enhanced Deterrence in the North, in 
which they call for establishing Northern European Air Defense which would 
cover all NB8 countries. Do you consider the idea (a) sensible and (b) realistic? 
 
Defense planning for a military crisis  
7) Due to geographical factors and infrastructure deficiencies, NATO’s ability for 
rapid reinforcement of its Eastern flank is limited.  
i) Do you think that there has been enough discussion about how air power 
could be used to help win precious time (and space) to bring in 
reinforcement? What do you see as the main challenges in doing so?  
8) NATO’s ability to apply air power will depend on whether or not the Alliance 
will have agreements to use Swedish and Finnish air surveillance data, air space 
and/or air bases.  
i) During the time of crisis, how contentious would you expect making these 
agreements to be? Can you see a possibility for making these (political) 
agreements for a military crisis scenario before a crisis actually appears?  
 
 
 
(Category: politicians in Estonian)  
Preliminary list of questions for a semi-structured interview on the  
perspective of politicians on the topic  
 
Õhuvõime Läänemere piirkonnas ja ohud Venemaalt  
1) Rääkides Läänemere regioonist ja üldisemalt, kuidas te näete õhuvõime rolli ja 
suutlikkust tagamaks heidutus ja kaitsmaks Balti riike (a) konventsionaalsete ja 
(b) hübriidohtude eest?  
2) Missugune on teie hinnang Venemaa õhuvõimekusele (sh A2/AD) ning kuidas 
võib Venemaa seda võimekust kasutada potentsiaalses provokatsioonis 
(halvimal juhul sõjalises sissetungis) Balti riikidesse?  
3) Pidades silmas NATO õhuvõimekust/õhuvahendeid, mis on (a) juba Balti 
regioonis ning neid, mida (b) saaks regiooni tuua, kas NATOl on vajalik 
võimekus, et saavutada õhuülekaal?  
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Kaitseplaneerimine rahu ajal  
4) Mõeldes NATO heidutuse tugevdamisest, kas teile tundub, et õhudimensiooni 
lisamine praegu maavägede lahingugruppidest koosnevale eelpaigutusele oleks 
(a) kasulik ning (b) poliitilisi olusid arvestades realistlik?  
5) Mis olukorras võiks NATO liitlased nõustuda Balti õhuturbemissiooni 
muutmisega Balti õhukaitsemissiooniks? Millal, kui üldse, oleks selle jaoks õige 
aeg?  
6) Missugused on õhuvõime kontekstis kõige olulisemad võimekused (sh võime 
liitlasi vastu võtta), mida Balti riigid peaksid ise arendama või looma?  
7) Mõttekoda CSIS hiljuti avaldas uuringu heidutusest Põhja-Euroopas, milles nad 
kutsuvad üles looma Põhja-Euroopa õhukaitset, mis kataks kõik NB8 riigid. Kas 
te peate seda (a) mõistlikuks ning (b) poliitilisi olusid arvestades realistlikuks?  
 
Kaitseplaneerimine sõjalise kriisi korral  
8) Geograafiliste ja infrastruktuuriliste puuduste tõttu on NATO võime lühikese aja 
jooksul Balti riikidesse täiendavaid vägesid tuua piiratud.  
i) Kas sellest on piisavalt räägitud, kuidas õhuvõime kasutamine saaks aidata 
seda probleemi leevendada? Mis oleks selle juures kõige suuremad 
väljakutsed?  
9) NATO suutlikkus sõjalise konflikti ajal Baltimaades oma õhuvõimet kasutada 
sõltub muuhulgas sellest, kas Alliansil on olemas lepingud kasutamaks Rootsi ja 
Soome situatsioonipilti õhuruumist, õhuruumi ja/või lennubaase.  
i) Kuidas teile tundub, kas nende lepingute sõlmimine kriisi ajal oleks 
poliitiliselt keerukas?  
ii) Kas võiks olla võimalus nende (poliitiliste) kokkulepete sõlmimiseks enne 
kriisi puhkemist?  
 
Muud teemad ja kommentaarid   
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Resümee 
2016.  aastal NATO poolt tehtud otsus vägede eelpaigutamiseks (eFP) Baltimaadesse 
ning Poola oli oluline saavutus, kuid eFP lahingugrupid ei ole mõeldud sõjalisteks 
operatsioonideks – nende peamine eesmärk on tagada, et kriisi korral oleks kogu allianss 
kaasatud. NATO karistusheidutuse tugevus  ja tõsiseltvõetavus sõltub väga tugevalt 
alliansi võimekusest kriisi ajal kiiresti vägesid juurde tuua. 
Läänemere regiooni geograafia piirab NATO operatsioonilist sügavust, mis on 
õhuoperatsioonide puhul väga oluline. Lisaks sellele on NATO tegevus vägede juurde 
toomisel piiratud Venemaa juurdepääsu ja tegevuse takistamine (A2/AD) võimekuse 
tõttu. Kaliningradi ning NATO-Venemaa piirile üles seatud võimsad maa-õhk tüüpi 
raketisüsteemid lubavad Venemaal luua tõkestatud juurdepääsuga tsooni (anti-access, 
A2), isegi kui NATO õhuvahendid sinna sisse pääsevad, on nende  opereerimine seal 
piiratud (area denial, AD). Antud raketisüsteemid on eriti ohtlikud seetõttu, et nende 
võimekus ulatub sügavale NATO territooriumile, ja seeläbi on neil otsene mõju alliansi 
julgeolekule.  
A2/AD kasutamine Venemaa poolt tähendab, et riik sihilikult vähendab NATO 
(karistus)heidutuse mõju, seades samal ajal üles tugevat tõkestusheidutust. NATO ei ole 
harjutanud vägede juurde toomist Balti riikidesse ja see vähendab alliansi usutavust ning 
võib panna Venemaa arvama, et tal on võimalik läbi sissetungi Balti riikidesse saavutada 
kiire võit ja fait accompli situatsioon enne seda, kui täiendavad NATO väed regiooni 
jõuavad.  
Õhuvõimel on mitmeid aspekte, mis teevad selle väeliigi sobivaks vägede juurde toomist 
toetama ja Venemaa A2/AD võimekust neutraliseerima. Õhuvõimel on samuti keskne 
koht situatsiooniteadlikkuse loomisel, juhtimise (command and control, C2), luure, seire 
ja rekke (intelligence, surveillance, reconaissance, ISR) tagamisel, ning õhukaitse (kuid 
mitte õhutõrje, mis kuulub maavägede kompetentsi) pakkumisel. Sõjalise kriisi olukorras, 
kus vägede juurde toomine on vajalik, on oluliste infrastruktuuri objektide nagu 
mobilisatsioonidepood, maanteed, õhu- ning merebaasid kaitsmine veelgi olulisem kui 
rahuajal, ja seda saab teha õhukaitse võimekuse kaudu.  
Praegune lühimaa õhutõrjevõimekus, mis suudab pakkuda vaid punkti kaitset, ja piiratud 
funktsioonide ja jõukasutusreeglitega (rules of engagement, RoE)  Balti 
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õhuturbemissioon ei valmista NATOt ette Balti riikides õhukaitset pakkuma. Adekvaatse 
õhutõrje – ja õhukaitse – puudumine on mitmetes dokumentides välja toodud kui 
võimelünk, mis vajab kiiret tähelepanu, sellegipoolest ei ole 2014. aastast peale suudetud 
lahendusega välja tulla. Üks käesoleva uurimustöö eesmärke on seda kompleksset teemat 
avada ja selgitada erinevaid põhjuseid, miks on alliansil olnud keeruline seda olukorda 
parandada.  
Viimaste aastate jooksul, kuid eriti viimastel kuudel, on mitmed eksperdid, 
uuringukeskused ja mõttekojad (näiteks Gorenc 2016; Coffey ja Kochis 2017; Conley, 
Rathke ja Melino 2018; Breedlove 2018; Harper, Lawrence ja Sakkov 2018) tulnud välja 
ideede ja soovitustega, kuidas õhukaitse probleemi lahendama asuda ja seeläbi NATO 
heidutus- ja kaitsevõimet parandada. Mis kirjandusest peaaegu täielikult puudub, on 
põhjalikum analüüs küsimustest ja probleemidest, mis antud teemaga seostuvad – see on 
lünk, mida käesolev magistritöö proovib täita. Ühtlasi on see, ja kahekümne 
ekspertintervjuu põhjal tehtud analüüs, ka antud töö suurim lisandväärtus.  
Ekspertintervjuude ning saadaoleva kirjanduse põhjal tehtud uurimus näitas, et julgeoleku 
ning õhuvõime teemadega tegelevatel inimestel Balti riikides, USAs, Suurbritannias, 
Rootsis ja Soomes on väga erinev arusaam sellest, kuidas NATO heidutust tugevdada 
kuni selleni, missugune näeks välja üleminek Balti õhuturbemissioonilt õhukaitsele. 
Alliansi ühtsuse hoidmine on kriitiliselt oluline. See on varasemast keerulisem seetõttu, 
et oportunistlik Venemaa testib NATO võimekust oma manipulatsioonitaktikate ning 
A2/AD võimekuse pideva kasvatamisega.  
Uuringu tulemustena ilmnesid kolm peamist mõtet:  
 Juurdepääsu ja tegevuse takistamise (A2/AD) mõiste täpne defineerimine, ja 
A2/AD rolli mõtestamine karistus- ja takistusheidutuse tagamisel on ebapiisav;  
 Ekspertide seas puudub ühine arusaam, missugune näeks välja üleminek Balti 
õhuturbemissioonilt õhukaitse missioonile;  
 Balti riikide koostöö ja üheselt õhukaitse küsimustes initsiatiivi haaramine on 
alatähtsustatud 
Esimene samm tagamaks mõiste A2/AD laiemat kasutust ja paremat äratundmist nii 
ekspertide kui laiema avalikkuse seas on nii inglise kui teistes keeltes täpsema ning 
kasutajasõbralikuma terminiga väljatulek. Selle parem teadvustamine ja NATO 
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doktriinist osaks tegemine aitaks alliansi sees kaasa parema üksteisemõistmise 
tekkimisele. Samuti tuleks rohkem avada A2/AD kui strateegiliselt väga olulise termini 
multidimensionaalset olemust.  
Balti õhuturbemissiooni muutmine õhukaitse missiooniks on teemana käsitletud olnud 
enam kui viimased kolm aastat, ja seetõttu on kahetsusväärne, et jätkuvalt ei ole ka 
ekspertide seas ühtset arusaama, mida see üleminek endast kujutaks. Ilma olulisi mõisteid 
defineerimata on väga keeruline millegi otstarbekuses selgust saada, ja seetõttu on 
oluline, et õhuturbelt õhukaitsele üleminek (või vähemalt konkreetsed variandid selle 
teostamiseks) oleks arusaadav ja ka liitlastele lihtsalt selgitatav.  
Balti riigid ja nende riigikaitse eelarved on väikesed, kuid sellegipoolest on koostööd 
tehes ning koos suurtel hangetel osaledes võimalik saavutada olulist edasiminekut 
õhutõrjevõimekuses. Nii Leedu kui Läti on esimesed sammud keskmaa õhutõrje 
võimekuse loomiseks astunud, kuid kolme Balti riigi seisukohalt võiks kõige parem 
variant olla koos edasi minemine. See aitaks alliansile tõestada, et Balti riigid võtavad 
uute võimekuste loomist tõsiselt, ning tulevikus võiks see liitlasi motiveerida panustama, 
et Balti riikide (keskmaa) õhutõrjet veelgi parandada.  
Balti riikide heidutuse ja õhukaitse teemad on hetkel väga aktuaalsed. NATO laiem 
eesmärk peaks olema oma heidutuse tugevdamine, et allianss saaks hakata astuma samme 
karistusheidutusest tõkestusheidutuse poole. Kuigi selleni on pikk tee, on oluline, et 
tõkestusheidutus ei muutuks millekski, mida saavad endale lubada ainult oportunistlikud 
riigid, kelle peamine eesmärk on Euroopa julgeolekuarhitektuuri lõhkumine.  
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